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I. INTRODUCTION
1

As 2011 dawned, California faced a monumental budget deficit. On January
10, Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr. implored the state legislature to address the
2
shortfall by enacting a large-scale budgetary realignment. Budgetary
realignments operate by “shifting authority, responsibility, and money for many
3
programs from state agencies to counties and sometimes cities or local districts.”
Interestingly, Governor Brown’s proposal embodied what may be termed a
4
“corrections realignment” component. It called on the legislature to transfer
certain costly state corrections responsibilities (namely, felon management
5
duties) to counties. In effect, corrections realignment would place certain
prisoners, of whom, up to that point, had been state prisoners under county
control. The governor predicted that a realignment of the state’s felon
management responsibilities would reduce California’s high corrections
6
expenditures and help alleviate the state’s fiscal woes.
While the governor and the legislature were working to close the budget gap,
California was in the midst of waging a major legal battle. In 2009, a federal
court had ordered California to reduce overcrowding in its prisons to cure
7
unconstitutional prisoner healthcare defects, and the State had appealed the order
8
to the United States Supreme Court. The Court heard oral arguments in late 2010
and was in the midst of deliberations when Governor Brown first unveiled his
9
budgetary realignment plan. Ultimately, five of the nine Supreme Court Justices
10
affirmed the prison population reduction order. On the same day the Court
issued its opinion, Governor Brown suggested the corrections realignment
embodied in his budgetary realignment proposal would help California satisfy the
1. See EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., GOVERNOR, CAL. STATE, 2011–12 GOVERNOR’S BUDGET SUMMARY 4
(2011), available at http://www.dof.ca.gov/budget/historical/2011-12/governors/summary/documents/2011-12_
Budget_Summary-State_of_California.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (projecting California’s
2011–12 budget to have a $25.4 billion deficit).
2. See discussion infra Part III.A.2 (noting Governor Brown’s recommendation of a budgetary
realignment to the California State Legislature).
3. DEAN MISCZYNSKI, PUB. POL’Y INST. OF CAL., RETHINKING THE STATE-LOCAL RELATIONSHIP:
CORRECTIONS 6 (2011).
4. See discussion infra Part III.A.3 (noting the 2011 budgetary realignment proposal contained a
corrections realignment aspect).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 70–73 (describing the corrections realignment component of the
budgetary realignment plan as a cost-savings measure).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 74–76 (discussing why and to what degree Governor Brown
anticipated corrections realignment to generate savings for California).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 105–08 (discussing the federal court’s prison population reduction
order).
8. See infra text accompanying note 109 (noting California’s appeal to the Supreme Court and the
Court’s grant of certiorari).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 117–19 (noting the timeframe for the Supreme Court’s
deliberations on the federal court order relative to Governor Brown’s unveiling of budgetary realignment).
10. See infra text accompanying note 110 (noting that the Supreme Court’s holding was 5–4).
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order (because it would have the effect of rerouting flows of inmates from state
11
prisons to county jails).
The main body of this article focuses primarily on the motivations behind
and consequences of the 2011 corrections realignment. Part II gives readers a
brief overview of the legislation. Part III examines the legislation’s fiscal and
legal impetuses in detail. Part IV considers corrections realignment’s likely
effects and possible adverse consequences. Part V offers closing remarks.
Appendices A through C are concerned primarily with supplying a legal
background for the 2011 corrections realignment legislation’s statutory changes
and then summarizing those changes. Appendices A through C are organized
topically, with Appendix A discussing California’s felon incarceration laws prior
and subsequent to corrections realignment, Appendix B discussing California’s
post-release supervision laws before and after corrections realignment, and
Appendix C discussing California’s early release laws prior and subsequent to
corrections realignment. Appendix D provides summary tables of the statutory
code sections affected by California’s 2011 corrections realignment legislation.
II. THE 2011 CORRECTIONS REALIGNMENT IN BRIEF

12

At its core, corrections realignment is about defining which level of
government is responsible for managing California’s felons—the state or the
counties. With that in mind, it is useful to know what distinguishes felons from
other criminal offenders. The answer, of course, is that felons are persons who
have been convicted of at least one felony. But that begs the question, what is a
felony? California law distinguishes types of crimes by the comparative
13
harshness of their penalties. Felonies are those crimes which prescribe the
stiffest penalties. By statute, a felony is any crime whose minimum (or only)
prescribed sentence exceeds one year of incarceration (every crime prescribing a
lesser term of imprisonment or a fine, or some combination of a lesser term and a
14
fine, is a misdemeanor or an infraction). In essence, then, corrections
realignment defines who is responsible for overseeing criminals whose minimum
sentences exceed one year of imprisonment.
Part II.A explains that, before corrections realignment, the state had the
responsibility to perform incarceration, post-release supervision, and parole
11. See infra text accompanying notes 123–25 (noting Governor Brown publicly contemplated
corrections realignment as a prison overcrowding reduction measure on the same day the Supreme Court
affirmed the federal court order).
12. Before delving into the causes and likely consequences of corrections realignment, readers would
benefit from having a working knowledge of legislation’s functions. This section aims to provide a general
sense of the scope and operation of the 2011 corrections realignment. For a more thorough discussion of the
legislation and its statutory enactments and amendments, see discussion infra Appendices A–C.
13. See infra note 169 (providing California’s punishment-based statutory definitions for crimes).
14. See infra note 169 and accompanying text (providing statutory definitions for felonies,
misdemeanors, and infractions).

426

06_FAZZI_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

3/29/2013 10:12 AM

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 44
revocation functions for each felon serving an executed sentence. For reasons
that will be discussed in Part III, infra, the legislature enacted corrections
realignment in early 2011 at Governor Brown’s urging. Under the legislation, the
state government passed key felon-management responsibilities to county
governments. Part II.B indicates the degree to which counties now partake in the
incarceration and supervision of felons serving executed sentences.
A. California’s Felon Management Landscape Before Corrections Realignment
Before corrections realignment, the state’s responsibility to manage felons
was fairly comprehensive. The state incarcerated every felon serving an executed
sentence because state law required every felony sentence to be executed, if at
15
all, in a state prison. The state’s felon management responsibility also included
post-release supervision because the law required all felons “released from . . .
16
prison [to] spen[d] time . . . in state-supervised parole.” Finally, the state’s
responsibility included a potential incarceration function for every felon on
parole because parolees who “violated the rules of their parole[] or
committed . . . new crime[s] . . . could be arrested . . . and sent back to
17
prison . . . .”
B. California’s Felon Management Landscape After Corrections Realignment
In post-realignment California, the state and the counties share the
responsibility of managing felons to a greater extent than before. Corrections
realignment became law in early 2011 when the California Legislature enacted
18
and Governor Brown signed Assembly Bill (AB) 109. AB 109 and its follow-up
15. See infra note 170 (indicating why, prior to corrections realignment, felony sentences could be
executed only in state prisons). Note that state prisons did not incarcerate all convicted felons but only felons
serving executed sentences. The reason is state law frequently affords sentencing judges the ability to suspend a
felon’s executed sentence and impose an alternative sentencing disposition such as probation. For a discussion
of alternative sentencing dispositions and California’s statutory definition of probation, see infra note 188 and
accompanying text. State trial judges have regularly suspended felons’ prison sentences and imposed an
alternative sentencing disposition. See MAC TAYLOR, CAL. LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF., ACHIEVING BETTER
OUTCOMES FOR ADULT PROBATION 6 (2009), available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/2009/crim/probation/
probation_052909.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“[A]lmost three-quarters of adult felon
offenders convicted in California in 2007 . . . were actually sentenced to probation or a combination of
probation and jail.”); MISCZYNSKI, supra note 3, at 12 (“In the 2009–10 fiscal year, about 323,000 people were
on probation in California, with 249,000 for felony convictions.”).
16. MISCZYNSKI, supra note 3, at 14. In general, “Parolees had to report to a state parole agent when
they returned to their communities and were subject to rules (such as no guns, no association with gang
members), drug tests and other inspections, and searches without search warrants.” Id. at 11.
17. Id. at 14.
18. 2011 Cal. Stat. ch. 15; see also Senate Floor Vote of AB 109, Unofficial Ballot (Mar. 17, 2011),
http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/asm/ab_0101-0150/ab_109_vote_20110317_0334PM_sen_floor.html (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review) (reporting the Senate approved AB 109 by a 24-to-16 vote on March 17,
2011); Assembly Floor Vote of AB 109, Unofficial Ballot (Mar. 17, 2011), http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-
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19

20

bills (“corrections realignment legislation”) essentially sorted felons into three
groups based on the legislatively determined seriousness of their crimes (lowlevel, mid-level, or high-level) and required counties to exercise certain felonmanagement functions for each group. The legislation set the respective state and
county shares of responsibility over the groups of felons on a sliding-scale basis.
In essence, corrections realignment used the legislatively determined seriousness
of any particular group’s crimes as a proxy for its amenability to county control
(in other words, its manageability) and apportioned felon management functions
21
to counties accordingly. As a result, felons whose crimes are the most serious
are treated as the least amenable to county control and left predominantly to state
control, while felons whose crimes are less serious are considered more
manageable and placed under significant (or complete) county control.
1. Counties Exercise Complete Control over “Low-Level” Felons
For the purposes of corrections realignment, a felon whose commitment
offense is non-violent, non-serious, and non-sexual, and who also has no prior
22
convictions for any serious, violent, or sexual crime, is a “low-level” felon. The

12/bill/asm/ab_0101-0150/ab_109_vote_20110317_0532PM_asm_floor.html (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (reporting the Assembly approved AB 109 by a 51-to-27 vote on March 17, 2011); Signing Message
from Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Cal. Gov., to the Members of the Cal. State Assembly (Apr. 5, 2011) [hereinafter
AB 109 Signing Message] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (signing AB 109 into law).
19. AB 109 was the main legislative instrument effectuating the 2011 corrections realignment. Compare
SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 109 (Mar. 17, 2011) (summarizing AB 109’s key
changes to existing law), with BROWN, supra note 1, at 22–24 (summarizing the governor’s corrections
realignment proposal). Four additional bills—AB 117, AB 118, AB 116, and AB 17 (First Extraordinary
Session)—enacted technical revisions and AB 109’s funding mechanisms. See 2011 Cal. Stat. ch. 39 (codifying
AB 117); 2011 Cal. Stat. ch. 40 (codifying AB 118); 2011 Cal. Stat. ch. 136 (codifying AB 116); 2011–12 1st
Ex. Sess. ch. 12 (codifying AB 17 (First Extraordinary Session)). See generally SENATE COMMITTEE ON
BUDGET AND FISCAL REVIEW, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 117, at 1 (Apr. 11, 2011) (explaining that AB 117
fixed errors contained in AB 109); SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 118, at 2 (June
28, 2011) (explaining that AB 118 implemented AB 109’s funding mechanisms); SENATE RULES COMMITTEE,
COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 116, at 1 (June 9, 2011) (explaining that AB 116 “contain[ed] provisions
necessary to implement the 2011–12 budget”); SENATE COMMITTEE ON BUDGET AND FISCAL REVIEW,
COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF ABX1 17, at 1 (Sept. 2, 2011) (explaining that ABX1 17 made “substantive and
technical changes relevant to AB 109”).
20. AB 109 was formally titled “the 2011 Realignment Legislation addressing public safety.” 2011 Cal.
Stat. ch. 15, § 1, at 7. However, this article uses the label “corrections realignment legislation” (rather than
“public safety realignment legislation” or some variation thereof) to refer to AB 109 and its follow-ups because
this article is concerned only with the felon management changes occasioned by those bills, changes
distinguishable from any other “public safety” ones by virtue of their correctional nature.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 23 and 27 (suggesting the relationship of county control to felon
manageability implicit in corrections realignment).
22. See BROWN, supra note 1, at 23 (using the terms “short-term, lower‑level offenders,” “low‑level
offenders,” and “short‑term offenders” interchangeably to refer to “offenders without any current or prior
serious or violent or sex convictions”). See generally id. at 131 (explaining that the low-level label applies to
persons whose commitment offense was a “drug or property” felony rather than a “crime[] against [a]
person[]”).
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corrections realignment legislation operates from the position that these felons
“are . . . sufficiently manageable and low risk that they can be safely held in
23
county jail and managed by county sheriffs” because it assigned the counties
total responsibility to manage them. Specifically, the realignment provisions
require each low-level felon sentenced on or after October 1, 2011, to serve his or
her executed sentence either entirely in county jail or split between county jail
24
and county probation. What this means is that, from October 1, 2011 onward,
corrections realignment completely rerouted the flow of low-level inmates from
state prisons to county jails.
2. Counties Supervise “Mid-Level” Felons upon Release from Prison
For the purposes of corrections realignment, a felon who is not low-level but
25
whose commitment offense is neither serious nor violent is a “mid-level” felon.
The corrections realignment legislation did not reroute their flow to jails; the
26
state retained the duty to incarcerate these individuals. However, the legislation
operates from the position that felons “at the mid-level” are “not high-level
27
enough to warrant state parole supervision” and requires counties, not the state
government, to supervise all such felons released from prison on or after October
28
1, 2011.

23. MISCZYNSKI, supra note 3, at 13.
24. See discussion infra Appendix A (discussing felony sentencing to county jail). Corrections
realignment marked “the first time in California’s history that . . . executed felony sentences [are] served in
county jails . . . .” GARRICK BYERS, REALIGNMENT 16 (Dec. 3, 2011 ed.) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review). Because felonies are the only crimes whose minimum sentences exceed one year, see infra note 169
and accompanying text (defining felonies), corrections realignment also marked first time “county jail sentences
[may exceed one year] . . . for a single offense . . . .” BYERS, supra, at 16. State attorneys and judges have
referred to county jails as “county prisons” to reflect their felon incarceration function. E-mail from Samuel T.
McAdam, Judge, Yolo County Superior Court, to author (Nov. 14, 2012, 07:40 PST) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review). But see MISCZYNSKI, supra note 3, at 14 “[C]ounties . . . handle these [felons]
differently than the state [did] . . . . Counties . . . use alternative sanctions . . . less costly than lock-up time.”).
25. See BYERS, supra note 24, at 15 (distinguishing “mid-level” felons from low-level and high-level
felons).
26. See infra text accompanying note 195 (noting corrections realignment precludes all felons but those
lacking current or prior convictions for serious, violent, and sexual felonies from serving their executed felony
sentences in county jails).
27. BYERS, supra note 24, at 15.
28. See infra text accompanying note 240 (noting corrections realignment places mid-level felons on
post-release community supervision). County-administered supervision differs from the state-administered
parole system because counties handle released felons “in a way quite different from the state’s approach.
Instead of relying primarily on one sanction—return to prison—to punish parole violations,” counties deploy “a
range of options,” and harsh sanctions “need approval from a court-appointed hearing officer.” MISCZYNSKI,
supra note 3, at 17.

429

06_FAZZI_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

3/29/2013 10:12 AM

2013 / California’s 2011 Corrections Realignment
3. Counties Incarcerate “High-Level” Felons Who Violate Their Parole
Conditions
For the purposes of corrections realignment, a felon whose commitment
offense is a serious or violent felony or a third strike offense, or who is a highrisk sex offender or possesses a mental disorder, is what may be termed a “high29
level” felon. Under the legislation, the state government retained significant
30
control over high-level felons, incarcerating them in its prisons and subjecting
31
them to parole supervision after they are released from prison. However, the
corrections realignment legislation transferred a measure of responsibility for
managing high-level felons to the counties by requiring county jails, rather than
32
state prisons, to incarcerate most parole violators. In effect, the legislation
almost completely rerouted the flow of parole violators from prisons to jails.
III. THE IMPETUSES BEHIND THE 2011 CORRECTIONS REALIGNMENT
As indicated in Part II, supra, corrections realignment required county jails to
house low-level felons and parole violators and to supervise mid-level felons
released from prison. These changes “may [have] be[en] the biggest . . . in
California[’s] criminal law since Determinate Sentencing replaced Indeterminate
Sentencing in 1978. [Corrections realignment] join[ed] ‘Proposition 8’ in 1982,
‘Proposition 115’ in 1991, ‘Three Strikes in 1994’, and other large-scale changes
33
in dramatically altering California’s criminal law landscape.” Changes this
dramatic do not emerge in a vacuum. To understand why corrections realignment
became part of California’s criminal law landscape, it is imperative we examine
closely the context in which the legislation arose and the problems that informed
its creation.
Part III examines corrections realignment in light of two impetuses.
Corrections realignment responded directly to a fiscal crisis, and Part III.A
indicates how. Corrections realignment also responded to a legal impetus. Part
III.B considers corrections realignment in light of California’s legal battle over
prison overcrowding the deleterious prisoner healthcare effects it entails.

29. See BYERS, supra note 24, at 15 (distinguishing “high-level” felons from low-level and mid-level
felons).
30. See infra text accompanying note 195 (noting corrections realignment precludes all felons but those
lacking current or prior convictions for serious, violent, and sexual felonies from serving their executed felony
sentences in county jails).
31. See infra text accompanying note 240 (indicating corrections realignment placed only mid-level
felons on post-release community supervision).
32. See infra text accompanying notes 258, 269–70 (indicating that most parole violations are
punishable by only up to six months in a county jail).
33. GARRICK BYERS, REALIGNMENT: AB 109 7 (June 27, 2011 ed.) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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A. The Fiscal Impetus Behind Corrections Realignment
Corrections realignment was a budget measure. It was embodied in a
budgetary realignment and enacted in response to a fiscal crisis. Part III.A
focuses primarily on the origins of California’s 2011 fiscal crisis and the
justifications and operation of Governor Brown’s budgetary realignment
proposal, including its corrections realignment component. More specifically,
Part III.A.1 examines the dual causes of the 2011 budget crisis, Part III.A.2
discusses the governor’s proposed solution in some depth, and Part III.A.3
indicates why the governor’s solution embodied a corrections component.
1. A Financial Crisis
a. Dual Causes: The Great Recession Plus a Structural Deficit
34

California faced a $25.4 billion budget deficit when 2011 began. In his
35
January 10th budget summary, Governor Brown attributed California’s financial
36
woes to a number of factors. Of those factors, the most significant one was the
37
revenue loss occasioned by the Great Recession. The Great Recession was “a
financial crisis instigated by risky financial activity that . . . [caused] the housing
38
bubble” to burst. From the official beginning of the Great Recession in
39
December 2007 to its official end in June 2009, “all of [California’s] major
40
revenues sources” —its “personal income tax, sales tax, and corporation
41
42
taxes” —fell significantly, causing California’s budget revenues to decline by
34. See BROWN, supra note 1 (reporting the projected scope of the 2011 budget gap).
35. See generally id. app. at 67 (defining “Governor’s Budget Summary” as “[a] companion publication
to the Governor’s Budget that outlines the Governor’s policies, goals, and objectives for the budget year. It
provides a perspective on significant fiscal and/or structural proposals.”).
36. See id. at 4–5 (defining the budget deficit).
37. Id. at 2.
38. Id. at 29. See generally R. Christopher Whalen, The Subprime Crisis—Cause, Effect, and
Consequences, 17 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 219 (2008) (discussing the Great Recession’s
causes); Yuliya Demyanyk & Otto Van Hemert, Understanding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 24 REV. FIN.
STUDIES 1848 (2011) (discussing the Great Recession’s causes). The recession cost the nation about “eight
million jobs,” BROWN, supra note 1, at 31, and some “$11 trillion in assets—nearly a year’s worth of . . .
economic output.” Id. at 30.
39. Business Cycle Dating Committee, National Bureau of Economic Research, NAT’L BUREAU ECON.
RESEARCH (Sept. 20, 2010), http://www.nber.org/cycles/sept2010.html (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
40. BLUE SKY CONSULTING GRP., CALIFORNIA’S BUDGET CRISIS 6 (2009), available at http://www.
blueshieldcafoundation.org/sites/default/files/publications/downloadable/10_2008_californias_budget_crisis_0.
pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
41. BROWN, supra note 1, app. at 67.
42. BLUE SKY CONSULTING GRP., supra note 40, at 6. For example, because California experienced its
“worst job losses on record” during the Great Recession, “losing nearly a million nonfarm jobs,” its “personal
income fell over $38 billion” in 2009. BROWN, supra note 1, at 33.
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about a quarter “from the height of revenues in 2007–08 to the bottom in 2009–
43
10.” “Although the economic downturn . . . [was] the chief contributor to [the]
budget gap,” Governor Brown observed, “California [also] entered the recession
with an existing structural budget deficit, meaning . . . revenues did not cover
44
costs.”
b. A Grim Outlook
In 2010, California’s economy recovered modestly from the revenue losses
45
wrought by the Great Recession. Governor Brown cautioned, however, the
state’s “[b]aseline revenues [would] not return to the [pre-Great Recession] level
until 2013–14 and, even then, projected revenues [would] be insufficient to pay
46
for program services . . . the state [was] committed to provide.” Moreover,
although California had enacted some “$103.6 billion in budgetary actions . . .
47
between 2008 and 2010,” most of them “were temporary or [they] failed
because of court challenges or faulty assumptions”; in short, they had not closed
48
California’s structural budget deficit. According to the governor, “[w]ithout
43. BROWN, supra note 1, at 1.
44. Id. at 2. See generally What Is a Structural Budget Deficit?, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF CAL.,
http://ca.lwv.org/lwvc/action/budget/SLF_budget_deficit.pdf (last visited June 15, 2012) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (defining a “structural budget deficit” as the situation that exists when, under “the
current revenue structure (e.g., taxes, fees, and other sources), the state has insufficient income to maintain
services at the current level”). The structural budget deficit began around the turn of the twenty-first century:
In 1998–99, the state’s budget was balanced and projected to remain in balance. . . . [O]ne year later,
revenues increased by 23 percent, due to a stock market and dot–com boom that drove
unprecedented increases in stock option and capital gains income. . . . The [revenue] surge
[prompted the state government to undertake] massive—and unsustainable—new spending
commitments. When revenues declined, the state relied mostly on one–time measures . . . to
temporarily reduce spending without cutting back underlying program commitments. Thus, the
structural deficit was born.
ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, GOVERNOR, CAL. STATE, 2009–10 GOVERNOR’S BUDGET SUMMARY 1 (2009),
available at http://www.dof.ca.gov/budget/historical/2009-10/governors/summary/documents/FullBudgetSumm
ary.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). From about 2004 to 2007, California’s budget had an
“imbalance of roughly $6 to $8 billion between ongoing spending and revenues.” BLUE SKY CONSULTING GRP.,
supra note 40, at 4. When revenues increased again, “from $76.8 billion in 2003–04 to $102.5 billion in 2007–
08,” id., the state government used much of that growth “to repay loans and backfill for the loss of temporary
cost-saving steps” rather than to remedy the structural deficit. SCHWARZENEGGER, supra, at 2.
45. See BROWN, supra note 1, at 32–34 (reporting California’s vehicle sales, home building, housing
prices, taxable sales, and exports rebounded somewhat in 2010 from their Great Recession levels).
46. Id. at 1. The governor explained, “economic recoveries following recessions caused by financial
crises are slower and more drawn out than those stemming from other causes.” Id. at 29. See generally id. at 32
(“[T]he unemployment rate often remains high after employment begins to recover[ is] because . . . hiring
usually lags behind output during the early stages of a recovery. . . . [F]irms tend to increase output first by
boosting productivity and by raising the number of hours worked by existing employees. Hiring . . . tends to
occur later.”).
47. Id.
48. Id. Seventy-five percent of the $24.3 billion in budget solutions enacted in the 2008–09 fiscal year,
84 percent of the $60 billion in budget solutions enacted in the 2009–10 fiscal year, and 85 percent of the $19.3
billion in budget solutions enacted in the 2010–11 fiscal year, were temporary or failed. Id. at 2.
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corrective action, . . . the structural deficit [would] persist and grow to between
49
$17.2 billion and $21.5 billion per year through 2014–15.”
2. The Governor’s Solution: A Vast Budgetary Realignment
a. Proposing Budgetary Realignment
Governor Brown recommended the state legislature balance the budget
principally through traditional budget-solving measures, such as spending cuts
50
and borrowing. However, he also intimated to the legislature that traditional
solutions without more would be insufficient to “balance the budget [in the
51
2011–12 budget year] and into the future, and to provide for a reserve.” He said
the Great Recession’s effects on California’s revenues had left “state and local
governments . . . [with in]sufficient resources to fund all program demands,” and,
“[a]bsent long-term change, government [would] eventually [have] to shift funds
from other important programs, including public safety, to pay for rising pension
52
and health care costs.” Accordingly, he urged the state legislature to enact a
budgetary realignment (in the governor’s words, “a vast . . . realignment of
government services”) that would “revers[e California’s] 30-year trend . . . [of
transferring] decision-making and budget authority . . . from local government[s]
53
to the State Capitol.”
b. Justifying Budgetary Realignment
54

When Governor Brown spoke of “a 30-year trend,” he was referring to the
fact that the state legislature had assumed programmatic authority from local
55
governments beginning in the 1970s, and, in the three-plus decades that

49. Id. at 2. See generally id. at 3 (projecting the state’s “Operating Deficit without Corrective Actions”
to be $19.2 billion in 2012–13, $17.4 billion in 2013–14, and $21.5 billion in 2014–15).
50. See id. at 5–6 (proposing $12.5 billion in spending cuts and $8.2 billion in one-time solutions such as
“borrowing from special funds” and “property tax shifts”).
51. Id. at 5.
52. Id. at 15.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. According to the governor, “Two major events began the shift of government responsibility in
California from local governments to the state level. . . . First, the California Supreme Court in 1971 ruled that
K-12 education is a fundamental constitutional right [and] . . . found that wealth-related disparities in per-pupil
spending generated by the state’s education finance system violated the equal protection clause of the state
Constitution.” Id. at 16. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 11 (repealed 1974) (“All laws of a
general nature shall have a uniform operation.”); id. § 21 (repealed 1974) (“No special privileges or immunities
shall ever be granted which may not be altered, revoked, or repealed by the Legislature; nor shall any citizen, or
class of citizens, be granted privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not be granted to all
citizens.”); Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241 (1971) (holding California’s public
school finance system had violated federal and state equal protection clauses); Dep’t of Mental Hygiene v.
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followed, had routinely shifted “revenue . . . and program responsibilities
56
between the state and counties.” According to the governor, the “numerous
57
shifts back and forth between the state and local government” created program
duplication at the different levels of government, ultimately “blurring
58
[governmental] responsibility and [increasing] program costs.” The governor
asserted that, by “untangl[ing] this knot and reduc[ing] duplication by providing
59
services at one level of government[] to the extent possible,” a budgetary

Kirchner, 62 Cal. 2d 586, 588, 400 P.2d 321, 322 (1965) (construing CAL. CONST. art. I, §§ 11, 21 to be
“substantially the equivalent” of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause). “This decision had
significant fiscal ramifications, as state government assumed responsibility for equalizing school funding.”
BROWN, supra note 1, at 16. See generally Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 18 Cal. 3d 728, 741–42, 557 P.2d 929,
935 (1976) (ordering California to equalize per pupil expenditures); 1972 Cal. Stat. ch. 1406 (enacting
provisions to equalize California’s per pupil expenditures). Then, “[a]n even more dramatic transfer of power to
the state government occurred in 1978 when voters adopted Proposition 13.” BROWN, supra note 1, at 16. See
generally Cal. Proposition 13 (1978) (enacting the “People’s Initiative to Limit Property Taxation”). Before
Proposition 13,
local entities set the property tax rate for their jurisdiction, based on policy and funding decisions
made primarily at the local level. Locally elected assessors determined the assessed value of
property. . . . Proposition 13 limited the property tax rate to 1 percent of assessed value, except for
pre-existing debt. The assessed value of property was set at the 1975–76 base year, changing only
when property is sold or new construction is completed. The property is then reassessed based on
“fair market value”, which is generally [its] purchase price . . . . A property’s base year value may be
increased by inflation, not to exceed 2 percent per year.
BROWN, supra note 1, at 16–17. See generally CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, §§ 1–4 (codifying Proposition 13’s
changes). About one month before Proposition 13 passed, the Legislative Analyst’s Office predicted the
initiative would cost local governments “$7 billion in property tax revenues,” some fifty-seven percent of their
property tax revenues—and twenty-two percent of their aggregate revenues—in the 1978–79 fiscal year.
Sonoma Cnty. Org. of Pub. Emps. v. Cnty. of Sonoma, 23 Cal. 3d 296, 309–10, 591 P.2d 1, 8 (1979). Absent
corrective action, local governments would likely have had to cut programs and lay off about 270,000
employees to compensate for the lost property tax revenues. Id. at 310, 591 P.2d at 8. As Governor Brown
observed, the state government
used its budget surplus to . . . “bail out” local governments for the 1978–79 fiscal year. The bail-out
consisted of allocations to local jurisdictions to make up for a significant portion of their property tax
loss. As part of the bail-out to counties, the state either assumed responsibility for programs or took
on new funding obligations. For instance, the state assumed the county share of Medi-Cal and
SSI/SSP and increased its share of funding for foster care.
BROWN, supra note 1, at 17. See generally 1978 Cal. Stat. ch. 292 (enacting the government bail-out). Then, in
1979, the state government enacted “a long-term financing mechanism . . . that essentially mirrored the one-year
bail-out. [It reallocated p]roperty tax . . . from K–14 schools to cities, counties, and special districts to make up
a significant portion of the loss of property tax, and the state [government] assumed a greater share of funding
for schools and some health and human services programs.” BROWN, supra note 1, at 17. See generally 1979
Cal. Stat. ch. 282 (enacting the long-term financing mechanism).
56. BROWN, supra note 1, at 18. See generally id. at 17–18 (listing “[t]he most salient” programmatic
and revenue transfers to occur between 1979 and 2011). For examples of the “numerous shifts back and forth
between the state and local government,” id. at 17, see 1982 Cal. Stat. chs. 328, 1594 (shifting Medi-Cal to the
counties); 1988 Cal. Stat. ch. 945 (shifting trial court funding to the state government).
57. BROWN, supra note 1, at 17.
58. Id. at 18.
59. Id.
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realignment would shrink the state government’s administrative costs
61
staffing needs.

60

and

c. Implementing Budgetary Realignment
In its conception, Governor Brown contemplated budgetary realignment as
comprising two steps: first, determining which level of government (state or
local) could “best and most cost-effectively . . . deliver[]” a program; and,
second, “provid[ing] a permanent funding source” to that level of government to
62
pay for the costs of delivering the program. Governor Brown advocated
63
implementing budgetary realignment in two phases. Phase one, set to begin in
the 2011–12 fiscal year, would transfer “$5.9 billion . . . of [public safety]
64
programs from the state to the counties . . . .” Phase two, set to begin after 2011,
would incorporate statutory changes related to the “[i]mplementation of national
65
health care reform . . . .” Once fully phased in, the realignment would
“restructure how and where more than $10 billion in a wide range of services are
66
delivered.” The governor conceded, “A [budgetary] realignment of this
67
magnitude raises significant issues.” However, he also admonished, “absent this
kind of change[,] many essential programs, including education and public
68
safety, [would] suffer extensive reductions.”
3. The Corrections Component of the Governor’s Solution
Governor Brown’s budgetary realignment embodied a corrections
component. When the governor tabbed various public safety services for phase
one of budgetary realignment, he focused in particular on shifting key state
69
government felon management duties to counties. As of early 2011,
incarcerating and supervising all felons with executed sentences was costing the

60. Id. at 7.
61. Id. at 16.
62. Id.
63. See generally id. at 19–28 (outlining the two phases of the 2011 budgetary realignment plan).
64. Id. at 6; see also id. at 19 (noting phase one programs “fall broadly into the category of public
safety”).
65. Id. at 28. See generally id. (providing that, under phase two, “the state will become responsible for
costs associated with health care programs, including California Children’s Services and In‑Home Supportive
Services, while the counties [will] assume responsibility for CalWORKs, food stamp administration, . . . child
support” and “child care programs”).
66. Id. at 6, 18.
67. Id. at 16.
68. Id.
69. See id. at 22–24 (presenting the 2011 corrections realignment).
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70

state a sizeable fortune. Cognizant of that, and clearly aware counties can
71
manage felons at a lower cost than the state government can, Governor Brown
urged the state legislature to undertake a corrections realignment and place all but
“the most serious and violent felony offenders” under some measure of county
72
control. He advocated, inter alia, requiring counties to incarcerate low-level
73
felons and parole violators and to supervise released mid-level felons. The
legislature took the governor’s advice and gave legal effect to his proposal by
enacting the legislation described in Part II.B, supra.
The governor contemplated that the state government would perpetually
74
reimburse counties for the costs of corrections realignment. In other words, he
intended the state to pay counties to house low-level felons and parole violators
and to supervise mid-level felons upon their release from prison. At first blush,
paying one level of government to perform what had until that point been another
government level’s functions may seem like an odd way to generate savings,
especially when those payments are to last into perpetuity. But, as indicated
70. Governor Brown projected California’s 2011–12 budget year corrections expenditures to total
approximately $9 billion, roughly ten percent of the state’s budget. Id. at 14. See generally MARK LENO,
SENATE COMMITTEE ON BUDGET AND FISCAL REVIEW, FINAL ACTION REPORT: A SUMMARY OF THE 2011
BUDGET ACT CHAPTER 33, STATUTES OF 2011, at 1 (2011), available at http://sbud.senate.ca.gov/sites/sbud.
senate.ca.gov/files/FAR/FinalActionReport2011.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (projecting all
state budgetary expenditures for the 2011–12 budget year to total $85.9 billion). The high cost was hardly
surprising given that, as of 2011, “California operate[d] 33 adult prisons, 42 incarceration camps, and 13
Community Correctional Facilities. . . . The state plan[ned] to . . . authorize 62,000 employees to run these
facilities in 2011–12.” MISCZYNSKI, supra note 3, at 8. See generally id. (“Camps are lower security facilities,
usually in rural areas, for lower level offenders. Community Correctional Facilities are run by cities or counties,
house parole violators and low security inmates, and typically provide more educational and rehabilitative
programming than prisons.”). The high projected corrections cost was consistent with prior years’ totals. See
ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, GOVERNOR, CAL. STATE, 2008–09 GOVERNOR’S BUDGET SUMMARY 20 (2008),
available at http://www.dof.ca.gov/budget/historical/2008-09/governors/summary/documents/BSUM.pdf (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review) (reporting California’s 2007–08 corrections expenditures to be $10.1
billion); SCHWARZENEGGER, supra note 44, at 18 (reporting California’s 2008–09 corrections expenditures to
be $9.685 billion); ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, GOVERNOR, CAL. STATE, 2010–11 GOVERNOR’S BUDGET
SUMMARY 13 (2010), available at http://www.dof.ca.gov/budget/historical/2010-11/governors/summary/
documents/FullBudgetSummary.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (reporting California’s 2009–10
corrections expenditures to be $8.16 billion).
71. As of early 2011, incarcerating a person in a county jail for one year cost roughly one-half the
amount of money required to incarcerate a person in a state prison for one year. See Letter from Diane M.
Cummins, Special Advisor to the Governor, State and Local Realignment, Cal. Dep’t of Fin., to Bob
Blumenfield, Chair, Conference Comm., and Mark Leno, Vice Chair, Conference Comm. (Feb. 25, 2011) (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review) (indicating that incarcerating a person in a jail cell cost approximately
$25,000 per year); MAC TAYLOR, CAL. LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF., CAL FACTS 55 (2011), available at
http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2011/calfacts/calfacts_010511.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“In
2009–10, the average cost to incarcerate an inmate in state prison was about $46,700.”). The comparatively high
cost of prison incarceration owed primarily “to security and inmate health care” costs. TAYLOR, supra, at 55.
72. BROWN, supra note 1, at 19–20.
73. See id. at 22–24 (outlining the governor’s felon management realignment proposals).
74. Id. at 26–27 (indicating corrections realignment would “rel[y] on maintaining current tax rates for
five years” and “[w]hen these taxes expire after five years, the state [government] will provide counties an
amount equal to what these [tax rates] will generate”).
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above, counties can manage felons at a lower cost than the state government can,
and, under corrections realignment, the state would be paying incarceration and
supervision costs at county rates rather than at their comparatively higher state
rates. Moreover, Governor Brown knew that the number of felons to be realigned
75
to county control figured to be quite large. For those reasons, he estimated that a
fully funded corrections realignment would help the state government to realize
76
savings growing to $1.4 billion in the 2014–15 fiscal year.
B. The Legal Impetus Behind Corrections Realignment
Corrections realignment was a budget measure. It was embodied in a
budgetary realignment and enacted in response to a fiscal crisis. However,
77
according to the Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO), “The 2011 realignment
was [also] undertaken . . . to [enable California to] comply with a federal court
order to reduce overcrowding in the state’s 33 prisons to no more than 137.5
78
percent of the[ir] design capacity by June 2013.” Because it essentially redirects
flow of low-level felons and parole violators from state prisons to county jails,
corrections realignment’s potential to reduce the state’s prison overcrowding
must have been clear, if not at the moment of its conception, then fairly early in
its development.
Part III.B focuses primarily on the development of California’s legal impetus
to reduce overcrowding in its prisons. Part III.B.1 notes how overcrowding in
California’s prisons generated deficiencies in prisoners’ healthcare. Part III.B.2
discusses how those healthcare deficiencies became the subject of two classaction lawsuits and explores the executive, legislative, and judicial remedies
flowing from those suits, including the prison overcrowding reduction order and
the United States Supreme Court’s review thereof. Part III.B.3 indicates how and
when Governor Brown implicated the corrections realignment legislation as a
solution to the state’s prison overcrowding problem.

75. See id. at 131 (“Lower‑level offenders currently represent almost half of the prison population on
any given day.”); id. (“The state . . . devotes a large share of its prison resources to short‑term incarcerations of
parole violators.”).
76. Id.
77. See generally id. app. at 68 (defining the Legislative Analyst’s Office as “[a] non-partisan
organization that provides advice to the Legislature on fiscal and policy matters”).
78. MAC TAYLOR, THE 2012–13 BUDGET: REFOCUSING CDCR AFTER THE 2011 REALIGNMENT, CAL.
LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF. 3 (2012), available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis/2012/crim_justice/cdcr022312.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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1. Severe Prison Overcrowding and the Resultant Healthcare Deficiencies
California’s history of prison overcrowding is long. The state’s prisoner
79
population has exceeded its prison system’s design capacity since roughly the
80
time San Quentin, California’s first prison, started operations. While the state
has adopted various measures throughout its history aimed, at least in part, at
81
reducing the extent of California’s prisoner population, those measures did not
prevent California’s prisons from becoming so severely overcrowded that they
82
developed “a [deficient] state of medical care.” The California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), the agency that runs California’s prison
83
84
85
system, provides medical and mental healthcare facilities and services to state

79. See id. at 8 (“Design capacity generally refers to the number of beds that [the state] would operate if
it housed only one inmate per cell in its 33 prisons, and did not use temporary beds, such as housing inmates in
gyms.”).
80. According to Ms. Kara Dansky of the Stanford Criminal Justice Center,
[C]onstruction began on San Quentin prison [in 1852] . . . . Until San Quentin was built, all of
California’s prisoners were held either on a ship called The Waban, docked in the San Francisco
Bay, or in the San Francisco city jail. . . . San Quentin’s population grew quickly in the early years,
and by 1858, there were close to 600 prisoners being held in an institution that had only sixty-two
cells.
Kara Dansky, Understanding California Sentencing, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 45, 53 (2008).
81. For example, in 1903, the state legislature enacted California’s first probation law, “permitting
courts to place defendants on probation rather than sentence them to prison.” Dansky, supra note 80, at 56; see
also 1903 Cal. Stat. ch. 34 (enacting California’s probation system). For California’s statutory definition of
probation, see infra note 188. Shortly after the state adopted its first probation law, “California’s governors
began to argue in favor of expanding [California’s] parole system as a mechanism to relieve overcrowding,”
and the state’s Board of Prison Directors complied. Dansky, supra note 80, at 58–59. For a judicial definition of
parole, see infra note 205. According to Ms. Dansky,
Between 1890 and 1900 the prison population rose by 73 inmates; between 1900 and 1906 the
population rose by another 503 inmates. . . . [T]he Board of Prison Directors . . . rapidly increase[ed]
parole grants.
Between 1907 and 1909, the rate of release on parole tripled and by 1914 there were almost as many
inmates being paroled as there were inmates discharged at the expiration of their terms. During this
period, the application process was simplified and the decision making process was more
streamlined. Between 1893 and 1916, California’s executive branch used parole openly, deliberately,
and extensively as a mechanism for reducing prison overcrowding by releasing offenders whose
determinate sentences (legislatively fixed and judicially imposed) had yet to expire.
Dansky, supra note 80, at 59. Then, in 1965, the state legislature incentivized increased probation rates by
enact[ing] the California Probation Subsidy Act . . . . This Act provided counties a maximum of
$4,000 for each adult or juvenile offender not committed to state prison (above historical
commitment levels) . . . . [T]he program was ultimately responsible for the diversion of more than
45,000 [adult and juvenile] offenders from state institutions to local probation and rehabilitationoriented programs.
Id. at 63 (internal quotation marks omitted).
82. Sherry Colb, Massive Prison Release and Least Restrictive Alternatives, DORF ON L. (Dec. 22,
2010), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2010/12/massive-prison-release-and-least.html (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review).
83. See generally BROWN, supra note 1, at 127 (“The California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR) is responsible for the incarceration of convicted felons.”).
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prisoners. However, because of severe prison overcrowding, the CDCR’s
86
“security staff [has] impose[d] frequent and persistent lockdowns,” limiting
87
ailing prisoners’ access to those facilities and services. Severe prison
88
overcrowding has also contributed to staffing shortages in prison medical units
89
and facilitated “the spread of infectious diseases” among prisoners.
2. How Two Class-Action Lawsuits Founded on Healthcare Deficiencies in
California’s Prisons Sparked Executive, Legislative, and Judicial
Remedies
a. The Cases: Coleman v. Brown and Plata v. Brown
In 1990, a class of seriously mentally ill California prisoners sued the State in
federal district court, claiming prison overcrowding had prevented them from
receiving constitutionally sufficient mental healthcare services while
90
incarcerated. In the resulting Coleman v. Brown, the court found the plaintiff
class had “languished for months, or even years, without access to necessary
91
care.” The court subsequently “appointed a Special Master to oversee
92
development and implementation of a remedial plan of action.”
84. Each California prison has low-acuity and high-acuity hospital beds. TAYLOR, supra note 78, at 20.
See generally id. (“Low–acuity hospital beds provide inpatient care to inmates who have complex medical
problems that require daily nursing care.”); id. (“High–acuity hospital beds are the highest level of inpatient
care available within CDCR prisons. These beds are for inmates who require nursing care 24 hours a day and
extensive assistance with daily activities such as bathing and eating.”). Each state prison also has “a medical
clinic where physicians deliver basic primary care to inmates on an outpatient basis.” Id.
85. See id. at 23–24 (describing California’s inmate mental health facilities).
86. Id. at 20. Were it not for prison overcrowding, prisoners would have been
initially housed in reception centers (usually in cells) upon their admission to [state prison]. After
which, the [prison would] assign[] inmates to different types of housing based on several factors
including offense, length of prison sentence, and behavior during current and prior incarcerations.
Inmates considered low security (classified as Levels I and II) [would] generally [be] housed in
dorms, while high–security inmates (classified as Levels III and IV) [would] generally [be] housed
in cells. Female inmates—regardless of classification—[would] often [be] placed in the same
housing units.
Id. at 10. However, because of overcrowding, state prisons utilized “nontraditional housing arrangements,”
holding prisoners “in gymnasiums and dayrooms” that are less secure than traditional dorms and cells (and
which thus contributed to conditions necessitating lockdowns). Id. at 20.
87. See id. at 20 (noting lockdowns limit prisoners’ ability to make “medical appointments and receive
their daily medications”).
88. See id. at 21 (“[Q]ualified [medical] applicants are often unwilling to work in the stressful
environment of an overcrowded prison.”).
89. Id.
90. Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282 (E.D. Cal. 1995).
91. Id. at 1316.
92. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1926 (2011). See generally BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 450 (3d
pocket ed. 2006) (defining “special master” as “A master appointed to assist the court with a particular matter or
case”); id. (defining “master” as “[a] parajudicial officer (such as a referee, an auditor, an examiner, or an
assessor) specially appointed to help a court with its proceedings” and explaining that “[a] master may take
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Then, in 2001, a “class of state prisoners with serious medical conditions”
sued California as well, claiming prison overcrowding had prevented them from
93
receiving constitutionally sufficient medical healthcare services. In the resulting
Plata v. Brown, “the State conceded that deficiencies in prison medical care [had]
violated prisoners’ Eighth Amendment rights . . . [and] stipulated to a remedial
94
injunction.” However, California did not “comply with the injunction, and in
95
2005 the [Plata C]ourt appointed a Receiver to oversee remedial efforts.”
Not only did matters not improve following Coleman’s and Plata’s
commencements, California’s prison overcrowding actually worsened, surging
from 202% of the prison system’s design capacity in June 2001 to 216% in June
96
2006. Convinced “a remedy for unconstitutional medical and mental health care
could not be achieved without reducing overcrowding,” the Coleman and Plata
plaintiffs independently filed motions for the court to reduce the prison
97
population under the federal Prison Litigation Reform Act. Subsequently, “[t]he
Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit convened a three-judge
court composed of the Coleman and Plata District Judges and a . . . Ninth Circuit
98
Judge” to consider whether to order the state to reduce its prison population.
b. Executive and Legislative Remedial Efforts
Between October 2006 (one month before the Coleman and Plata plaintiffs
filed their independent motions) and August 2009 (the month the three-judge
testimony, hear and rule on discovery disputes, enter temporary orders, and handle other pretrial maters, . . .
usu. with a written report to the court”).
93. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1926.
94. Id.
95. Id. See generally BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 595 (3d pocket ed. 2006) (defining “receiver” as “[a]
disinterested person appointed by a court . . . for the protection or collection of property that is the subject of
diverse claims (for example, because it belongs to a bankrupt or is otherwise being litigated)”).
96. The state’s official prisoner population figure rose from 161,497 to 172,561 in that five-year span.
CAL. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS & REHABILITATION, SPRING 2010 ADULT POPULATION PROJECTIONS 2010–2015,
at 39 (2010), available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/reports_research/Offender_Information_Services_Branch/
Projections/S10Pub.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). See generally State Responds to Three-Judge
Court’s Order Requiring a Reduction in Prison Crowding, CDCR TODAY (June 7, 2011),
http://cdcrtoday.blogspot.com/2011/06/state-responds-to-three-judge-courts.html (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review) (calculating the state prison system’s design capacity at 79,858).
97. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1927–28. The Prison Litigation Reform Act provides, “In any civil action in
Federal court with respect to prison conditions, a prisoner release order shall be entered only by a three-judge
court in accordance with section 2284 of title 28.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(B) (2006). See generally 28 U.S.C.
§ 2284(b)(1) (“Upon the filing of a request for three judges, the judge to whom the request is presented shall . . .
notify the chief judge of the circuit, who shall designate two other judges, at least one of whom shall be a circuit
judge. The judges so designated, and the judge to whom the request was presented, shall serve as members of
the court to hear and determine the action or proceeding.”). “The three-judge court shall enter a prisoner release
order only if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that crowding is the primary cause of the
violation of a Federal right,” 18 U.S.C. § 2284(a)(3)(E)(i), and “no other relief will remedy the violation of the
Federal right.” Id. § 3626(a)(3)(E)(ii).
98. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1922.
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panel issued its findings), the state government enacted several new prisoner
population reduction measures. For example, in October 2006, Governor Arnold
99
Schwarzenegger declared a state of emergency and authorized the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to transfer state prisoners to out-of100
state institutions. One year later, in 2007, the state legislature enacted Section
101
15819.40 of the California Government Code, which “authorized a total of $7.7
billion . . . for a broad package of state prison and local jail construction and
102
rehabilitation initiatives . . . .” And, in 2009, the state legislature enacted a bill
that “shorten[ed] prison stays[ and] made it harder to return an offender to prison
103
for a parole violation.”
c. A Judicial Remedy: A Prisoner Population Reduction Order
The prisoner population reduction measures adopted between late 2006 and
late 2009 had perceptible effects: after the state’s prison population peaked at
approximately 217% of design capacity in June 2007, it subsequently dropped to

99. CA.GOV, PRISON OVERCROWDING STATE OF EMERGENCY PROCLAMATION (Oct. 4, 2006), available
at http://gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=4278 [hereinafter PRISON OVERCROWDING PROCLAMATION] (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review); see also id. (“[A]ll 33 [state] prisons are now at or above maximum operational
capacity, and 29 of the prisons are so overcrowded that . . . [the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation] house[s] more than 15,000 inmates in conditions that pose substantial safety risks.”). Under the
Government Code, a governor may call a state of emergency by
[p]roclaim[ing the] existence of conditions of disaster or of extreme peril to the safety of persons and
property within the state caused by . . . conditions . . . other than conditions resulting from a labor
controversy or conditions causing a “state of war emergency,” which, by reason of their magnitude,
are or are likely to be beyond the control of the services, personnel, equipment, and facilities of any
single county, city and county, or city and require the combined forces of a mutual aid region or
regions to combat . . . .
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8558(b) (West 2012). Note that, by its terms, Government Code section 8558(b)
contemplates declarations of a state of emergency to respond to “conditions [such] as air pollution, fire, flood,
storm, epidemic, riot, drought, sudden and severe energy shortage, plant or animal infestation or disease, . . . or
volcanic prediction, or an earthquake.” Id. However, a “Governor can proclaim a state of emergency based upon
a condition occurring in a state prison.” Cal. Corr. Peace Officers’ Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 163 Cal. App. 4th
802, 817, 77 Cal. Rptr. 3d 844, 854 (3d Dist. 2008). See generally id. at 818, 77 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 855 (“[T]he
facts presented by . . . Governor [Schwarzenegger] . . . were sufficient to establish that the prison inmate
overcrowding occurring in October 2006 was a condition of the requisite magnitude that, if not addressed,
would likely require the combined forces of a mutual aid region or regions to combat, i.e., would likely require
the coordination and utilization of the multiple resources of state and local government.”).
100. PRISON OVERCROWDING PROCLAMATION, supra note 99. The state had previously contracted “with
four California counties to house 2,352 . . . [prisoners] in local adult jails, but this [had] create[d an]
overcrowding problem.” Id. Namely, “[o]n a typical day, the county jails lacked space for more than 4,900
inmates across the state. . . . 20 of California’s 58 counties ha[d] court-imposed population caps resulting from
litigation brought by or on behalf of inmates in crowded jails and another 12 . . . ha[d] self-imposed caps.” Id.
101. GOV’T § 15819.40 (enacted by 2007 Stat. ch. 7).
102. TAYLOR, supra note 78, at 11.
103. MISCZYNSKI, supra note 3, at 25; see also 2009 Cal. Stat. ch. 28 (enacting conduct credit reforms
and non-revocable parole). For more information on non-revocable parole, see infra note 233. For a discussion
of conduct credits, see infra text accompanying notes 272–78.
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104

about 214% by June 2008 and 210% by June 2009. However, those effects
were apparently insufficient. On August 4, 2009, the three-judge panel convened
by plaintiffs in Coleman and Plata found California’s prisoner medical and
mental care violated the Federal Constitution’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment
105
Clause and that overcrowding was the principal cause.
After issuing its findings, the three-judge panel “ordered California to reduce
its prison population to 137.5% of the prisons’ design capacity [(which, based on
a then-design capacity of 79,858, equaled approximately 109,800 prisoners)]
106
within two years.” The three-judge panel also established six-month population
reduction “benchmarks” for the state to satisfy while approaching the two-year
107
deadline. The prison population reduction order left “the choice of means to
reduce overcrowding to the discretion of state officials. But absent compliance
through new construction, [additional] out-of-state transfers, or other means—or
modification of the order upon a further showing by the State—the State [would]
be required to release some number of prisoners before their full sentences [had]
108
been served.” The State appealed the order to the United States Supreme Court,
109
and the Court stayed the order and granted certiorari.
d. Brown v. Plata: The United States Supreme Court Affirms the Order
In Brown v. Plata, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the federal
110
three-judge panel’s prison population reduction order by a 5–4 vote. Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for the Plata majority, confirmed that the state
prison system’s medical and mental healthcare services did not satisfy the Eighth
111
Amendment, overcrowding was the principal cause of those constitutional
104. CAL. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS & REHABILITATION, supra note 96, at 39. See generally id. (reporting
California’s prison population to be 173,312 in June 2007, 170,973 in June 2008, and 167,832 in June 2009).
105. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923–25 (2011). See generally U.S. CONST. amend. VIII
(“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.”).
106. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1928.
107. See Order to Reduce Prison Population, Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. Civ. S-90-0520 LKK
JFM P, Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. C01-1351 TEH at 4 (E.D. Cal., N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2010) (specifying the
six-month population-reduction benchmarks the state must meet).
108. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1923.
109. Id. at 1928.
110. Adam Liptak, Justices, 5–4, Tell California to Cut Prisoner Population, N.Y. TIMES (May 23,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/24/us/24scotus.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
111. See Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1947 (“The medical and mental health care provided by California’s
prisons falls below the standard of decency that inheres in the Eighth Amendment.”). See generally id. at 1924
(“Prisoners in California with serious mental illness do not receive minimal, adequate care. Because of a
shortage of treatment beds, suicidal inmates may be held for prolonged periods in telephone-booth sized cages
without toilets.”); id. at 1925 (“Prisoners suffering from physical illness also receive severely deficient care.
California’s prisons . . . have only half the clinical space needed to treat the current population. A correctional
officer testified that, in one prison, up to 50 sick inmates may be held together in a 12-by 20-foot cage for up to
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deficiencies, and “[w]ithout a reduction in overcrowding, there [would] be no
efficacious remedy for the unconstitutional care of the sick and mentally ill in
113
California’s prisons.” He noted, “mistaken or premature release of even one
prisoner can cause injury and harm” and “releas[ing] . . . prisoners in large
114
numbers . . . is a matter of undoubted, grave concern.” He also emphasized that
the state government could satisfy the population reduction benchmarks through
other “measures, including [conduct] credits and diversion of low-risk offenders
115
and technical parole violators to community-based programs . . . .” However,
he conceded “[t]he population reduction . . . required is . . . of unprecedented
116
sweep and extent.”
3. Post-Plata, Governor Brown Contemplated Corrections Realignment as
a Prisoner Population Reduction Measure
The United States Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Plata on
November 30, 2010, but did not decide the case until May 23rd of the following
117
year. This means that, from January 10, 2011, the day Governor Brown first
118
proposed corrections realignment to the state legislature, until some forty-nine
days after he signed corrections realignment into law, the possibility existed that
the Court would uphold the 2009 order of the federal three-judge panel directing
California to reduce overcrowding in its prisons. But, while it must have been
clear fairly early on in the conception of corrections realignment that rerouting
the flow of low-level felons and parole violators from state prisons to county jails
would help to satisfy the prison population reduction order, Governor Brown did
119
not tout that potential when he urged the state legislature to adopt his plan.
On April 4th, when Governor Brown signed the corrections realignment
legislation into law, he again did not assert it would reduce California’s prison
120
population. However, he made the following declaration: “For too long, the
state’s prison system has been a revolving door for lower-level offenders [as well
five hours awaiting treatment.” (citation omitted)).
112. Id. at 1923. See generally id. at 1924 (“Overcrowding has overtaken the limited resources of prison
staff; imposed demands well beyond the capacity of medical and mental health facilities; and created unsanitary
and unsafe conditions that make progress in the provision of care difficult or impossible to achieve.”).
113. Id. at 1939.
114. Id. at 1923.
115. Id.
116. Id. See generally MISCZYNSKI, supra note 3, at 10 (“[T]he population in California’s . . . prisons
. . . declined to 144,237 prisoners by the end of June 2011 . . . . The state need[ed] a further reduction of 34,433
prisoners by June . . . 2013, to satisfy the federal court order.”).
117. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1910.
118. See generally BROWN, supra note 1 (proposing the budgetary realignment, and, by extension, the
corrections realignment embodied in it, on January 10, 2011).
119. See id. at 22–24 (summarizing the governor’s corrections realignment proposal, but not mentioning
the legislation’s potential to reduce prison overcrowding by rerouting prisoners to jails).
120. AB 109 Signing Message, supra note 18.
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as] parole violators who are released within months . . . . Cycling these offenders
121
through state prisons . . . aggravates crowded conditions . . . .” By saying that
incarcerating low-level felons and parole violators “aggravates crowded
122
conditions,” the governor seems to have invited the inference that corrections
realignment would reduce the state’s prison overcrowding, at least to the extent it
redirected those offenders to county jails.
123
Then, on the day the United States Supreme Court issued its Plata opinion,
Governor Brown issued a press release containing the following statement: “The
Supreme Court has upheld a lower court’s decision that California must reduce
its prison population. In its ruling, the Supreme Court recognized that the
enactment of [corrections realignment legislation] is key to meeting this
124
obligation.” Governor Brown’s apparent purpose in issuing the press release
was to generate legislative support for a constitutional amendment guaranteeing
125
funding for corrections realignment notwithstanding. However, his assertion
that the United States Supreme Court recognized the enactment of corrections
realignment legislation as key to reducing California’s prison overcrowding
suggests Governor Brown also contemplated corrections realignment to function
as a prison population reduction measure.
IV. THE LIKELY EFFECTS AND POSSIBLE ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES OF THE 2011
CORRECTIONS REALIGNMENT
Part III established that the corrections realignment legislation was a budget
measure. It also established that Governor Brown contemplated corrections
realignment to reduce the state’s prison overcrowding. Part IV.A discusses the
likely effects of corrections realignment. Part IV.B considers its possible adverse
consequences.

121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011).
124. See Press Release, Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Governor Brown Issues Statement on U.S.
Supreme Court Ruling (May 23, 2011) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
125. Governor Brown’s complete statement was as follows: “The Supreme Court has upheld a lower
court’s decision that California must reduce its prison population. In its ruling, the Supreme Court recognized
that the enactment of [corrections realignment] is key to meeting this obligation, We must now secure full and
constitutionally guaranteed funding to put into effect all the realignment provisions contained in [corrections
realignment]. As we work to carry out the Court’s ruling, I will take all steps necessary to protect public
safety.” Id. (emphasis added).
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A. The Likely Effects of Corrections Realignment
1. Corrections Realignment Will Likely Generate Significant Savings for
the State
Governor Brown projected realigning the state’s authority over the parole
revocations of high-level felons, over the incarceration of lower-level felons, and
over the post-release supervision of mid-level felons to reduce state government
126
expenditures by an amount growing to $1.4 billion in the 2014–15 fiscal year.
127
The Senate Budget and Fiscal Review Committee made similar projections.
The Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO) also projected corrections realignment to
reduce the state government’s expenditures; however, its figures suggested the
savings will exceed Governor Brown’s projections and grow to approximately
128
$1.7 billion in the 2014–15 fiscal year. Thus, corrections realignment will
likely help California to realize significant future savings.
2. Corrections Realignment Will Likely Reduce the Prisoner Population
The corrections realignment legislation will likely help California to meet its
legal imperative to reduce the state’s prisoner population. The CDCR estimated,
under corrections realignment, the average daily prison population for the 2011–
12 fiscal year would “be nearly 11,000 inmates, or 7 percent[] lower . . . than it
129
would have been in the absence of realignment.” Additionally, upon full
implementation in “2016–17, . . . the prison population [would] be lower by
nearly 40,000 inmates, or 24 percent, than it otherwise would have been absent
130
the 2011 realignment.” The LAO agreed with the CDCR that realigning felons
131
to local jurisdictions will reduce the prison population and consequently
126. See supra text accompanying note 76 (reporting Governor Brown’s prediction for the savings to be
generated by enacting corrections realignment legislation).
127. In its final report on the budget and related legislation, the Senate Budget and Fiscal Review
Committee predicted corrections realignment would reduce the state government’s corrections expenditures by
an amount growing to roughly $1.3 billion in 2014–15. LENO, supra note 70, at 5-1.
128. The LAO predicted corrections realignment would reduce the state’s expenditures by an amount
growing to “about $1.7 billion in 2014–15,” TAYLOR, supra note 78, at 7–8, suggesting the legislation’s savings
will exceed even the governor’s initial estimates.
129. Id. at 6.
130. Id. See generally id. (predicting, based on early 2012 figures, California’s “prison system . . . [will]
have about 124,000 inmates” in the 2016–17 fiscal year). Just as an aside, corrections realignment may reduce
the state’s female prisoner population by half, because about half of all female prisoners are low-level offenders
by the terms of the corrections realignment legislation. Heather Tirado Gilligan, After Realignment, Fewer
Women Expected in Prison, HEALTHYCAL.ORG (Sept. 11, 2011), http://www.healthycal.org/tag/ab-109 (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
131. See MAC TAYLOR, A STATUS REPORT: REDUCING PRISON OVERCROWDING IN CALIFORNIA, CAL.
LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF. 6 (2011), available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2011/crim/overcrowding_080511
.pdf [hereinafter TAYLOR, STATUS REPORT] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (projecting corrections
realignment to alleviate prison overcrowding).
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“alleviate many of the operational challenges to the inmate medical care program
132
. . . .” Corrections realignment will thus solve many of the problems underlying
Plata; it will be “easier [under the legislation] for the [CDCR] to deliver
adequate care to inmates who are currently receiving outpatient care at existing
133
prisons . . . .” In addition, by the time corrections realignment is fully phased
in, the “CDCR will be at or above the capacity needed to deliver treatment to
134
most . . . mentally ill male inmates . . . .”
Incidentally, corrections realignment will likely shrink the state’s parolee
135
number even more dramatically than it will the prisoner population. The LAO
projected “the average daily parole population [in the 2011–12 fiscal year would]
be nearly 4,300 parolees, or 5 percent lower, . . . than it would have been in the
136
absence of realignment.” The LAO also predicted, drawing on CDCR data,
that, “[b]y 2016–17, . . . the parole population [would] be nearly 51,000 parolees,
or 66 percent lower, than it otherwise would have been absent the 2011
137
realignment.” This reduction will likely lead to increased “resources in parole
138
programs relative to in–prison programs after realignment.”
B. The Possible Adverse Effects of Corrections Realignment and Additional
Concerns Raised by Its Enactment
1. Reducing the Size of the Prison Population May Yield Adverse Effects
The LAO cautioned that by reducing prisoner numbers “in low security,
139
female, and reception center facilities” but not in high-security housing
132. TAYLOR, supra note 78, at 21.
133. Id. See generally id. (“[L]ockdowns should decline as a result of realignment, which will make it
easier for inmates to get to their health care appointments and receive medication. In addition, reduced
overcrowding should make it easier for [the CDCR] to hire needed medical care staff.”). The LAO also
predicted corrections “realignment will reduce the number of new inmates arriving at reception centers from
about 9,000 per month to about 2,400 per month, freeing up resources that would otherwise be used on inmate
evaluations. Reduced overcrowding will also decrease the spread of infectious diseases . . . .” Id.
134. Id. at 24.
135. Id. at 6.
136. Id. at 6–7.
137. Id. at 7. See generally id. (projecting that, in 2017, the state’s parole population will stand at
approximately 26,000).
138. Id. at 29. Moreover, “the post–realignment inmate and parolee population will have a relatively
higher proportion of inmates who have a lower risk to reoffend, as well as a relatively lower proportion of
inmates who have a high risk to reoffend.” Id.
This is likely because the inmates and parolees remaining after realignment will be relatively older
because they are serving longer sentences because of their current or prior violent and serious
crimes. . . . [T]he risk of reoffending decreases significantly with age. Alternatively, the inmates and
parolees being realigned tend to be repeat offenders who regularly cycle in and out of prison and
thus have a higher risk to reoffend on average.
Id.
139. Id. at 11.
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facilities, corrections realignment would likely create a “mismatch between
141
[cell] capacity and actual [cell] needs . . . .” As a result, by the 2016–17 fiscal
year, “the state [would] have excess low–security and reception center [cells] and
142
insufficient high–security” cells to accommodate state prisoners. In other
words, California’s “low–security and reception center facilities . . . [will have]
large amounts of unused space,” but its high-security prisons will continue to be
143
severely overcrowded. The LAO also cautioned that corrections realignment
will remove many of the felons eligible for the state’s forty-two adult fire camps
144
from state custody. Finally, the LAO has challenged the notion that corrections
realignment without more is sufficient to enable California to satisfy all of
145
Plata’s six-month population reduction benchmarks.
2. Corrections Realignment May Compel Early Releases and Pose Other
Safety Risks
As of January 2011, “over one-third of counties [were] under court-ordered
146
jail population limits” due to overcrowding, and in no condition to assume
control over low-level felons realigned into their jurisdictions. If those counties’
140. See id. (“While the number of high–security inmates will also decrease under realignment, they will
make up a smaller share of the total reduction . . . .”).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 11–12. See generally id. at 12 (“[T]here will be excess capacity of 6,400 beds in reception
centers, 6,800 beds in low-security prisons, and about 2,100 excess female prison beds. Conversely, . . . there
will be a shortage of 12,900 high-security beds.”).
143. Id. at 11.
144. California’s fire camp prisoner population will likely fall “to about 2,500 inmates by 2016–17,
representing a 38 percent decline from 2010–11.” Id. at 17. Numeric losses may be offset somewhat because the
corrections realignment legislation “authorized counties to contract for space in fire camps for offenders
currently housed in jails.” Id. at 17.
145. See id. at 9 (“[T]he state [will likely] miss[] the final population limit of no more than 110,000
inmates housed in state prisons by June 2013. Specifically, . . . [it will] exceed[] this limit by about 6,000
inmates. However, . . . the state will [likely] meet the court-imposed limit by the end of 2014.”). But see id. at
9–10.
[T]here is uncertainty as to whether the state will, in fact, miss those deadlines as they approach. . . .
[The CDCR’s] longer-term projections could be either high or low depending on a variety of future
factors, such as how successful counties are in managing their existing and realigned offender
populations and whether there are any significant changes in judicial and prosecutorial practices that
affect the number of offenders sentenced to state prison.
Id.
146. LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF., GOVERNOR’S REALIGNMENT PLAN—CRIMINAL JUSTICE 8 (2011),
available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/handouts/crimjust/2011/CJ_Realignment_Plan_01_25_11.pdf (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review). The state’s
jails have followed a path similar to state prisons and many are crowded today. California has 480
adult jails, although many of these are at city police stations or at short-term holding facilities near
courts for prisoners on trial. Longer-term jails held a daily average of 73,846 prisoners in the first
half of 2010 . . . . “Board-rated capacity,” the county jail equivalent to design capacity for state
prisons, was 75,728 beds as of 2007.
MISCZYNSKI, supra note 3, at 10.
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jails are to accommodate realigned felons, they may have to release some
147
misdemeanants early. Otherwise, they risk becoming home to just the sort of
148
Eighth Amendment violations that were at the heart of the Plata controversy.
149
Early release could pose safety risks to the public.
Besides its potential to compel early releases, corrections realignment may
pose safety issues for jailers and misdemeanants serving their executed jail
sentences. While county incarceration of low-level felons seems to have been
based on the notion that such felons “are . . . sufficiently manageable and low
150
risk that they can be safely held in county jail and managed by county sheriffs,”
it may be “that county jail space is . . . not built or staffed to the same security
151
standards required” to incarcerate felons.
3. Corrections Realignment May Prompt Disparate Prosecutorial Practices
Corrections realignment may foster disparate prosecutorial practices. The
legislation “increases the latitude of local governments to follow their own policy
152
preferences” with respect to incarceration. This latitude is unlikely to be
expressed in inter-county jail disparities because jailers receive standardized
training across the state and courts regularly hear inmates’ “cruel and unusual

147. Press Release, Connie Conway, Assembly Member, Cal. State Assembly, Governor Brown Signs
Legislation to Shift Dangerous Felons to Overcrowded Local Jails or Released Early (Apr. 4, 2011) (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review). Releasing jail inmates early is hardly a novel concept in California. See
PRISON OVERCROWDING PROCLAMATION, supra note 99 (“[In 2005], 233,388 individuals statewide avoided
incarceration or were released early into local communities because of the lack of jail space.”); MISCZYNSKI,
supra note 3, at 10 (“In 2010, about 13,000 inmates were released early each month because of [court-ordered]
population caps.”). Counties do have the option to contract with the state government to incarcerate jail inmates,
but that would both frustrate the goal of alleviating prison overcrowding, Joshua Page, Guarding Against
Reform: CA’s Corrections Officers Need to Let Some of Their Charges Go, NEW AMERICA FOUND. (May 5,
2011), http://california.newamerica.net/node/51617 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review), and require
counties to pay incarceration costs at the comparatively high state rate. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF CAL.,
COMMUNITY SAFETY, COMMUNITY SOLUTIONS: IMPLEMENTING AB 109: ENHANCING PUBLIC SAFETY, SAVING
MONEY AND WISELY ALLOCATING LIMITED JAIL SPACE 5 (2011), available at http://www.aclunc.org/issues/
criminal_justice/asset_ upload_file464_10365.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). For a comparison
of the state’s per-inmate incarceration costs and the counties’ per-inmate incarceration costs, see supra note 71.
148. See Justine Sharrock, CA Not Ready to Relieve Overcrowding, CORRECTIONS.COM (June 2, 2011),
http://www.corrections.com/news/article/28696 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (reporting Los
Angeles County jails, for example, already faced Eighth Amendment difficulties).
149. See MISCZYNSKI, supra note 3, at 29 (“Corrections realignment could foster an increase in
crime. . . . Released offenders have a fairly high likelihood of committing additional crimes after release, and
putting them back on the streets sooner might speed up the process.”). But see id. (“However, if realigned
corrections puts offenders under the management of local officials who have a greater stake than state prison
employees in their rehabilitation, and if counties coordinate social service and educational programming
effectively, the net result might be reduced crime and a reduced flow of offenders to prisons and jails overall.”).
150. Id. at 13.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 25.
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punishment” claims. But it may be expressed in prosecutorial practices to the
extent prosecutors take the increased strain wrought by corrections realignment
on their local jails’ capacities into account when deciding which felony charges
154
to file against a defendant. Any sort of artificial “up-charging,” resulting in
more state prison sentences, would unfairly prejudice defendants and frustrate the
state government’s efforts to comply with the Plata prison population reduction
155
order.
4. Corrections Realignment May Raise Equal Protection Concerns
The corrections realignment legislation may prompt some felons and
156
misdemeanants to file state and federal equal protection claims because the
legislation’s changes—particularly those related to county jail sentences for low157
level felons and equalized conduct credit ratios for state prisoners and county
158
159
jail inmates —are not retroactive. The corrections realignment legislation may
even prompt county correctional officers to raise equal protection claims due to
160
unequal state-local law enforcement immunities. Finally, it is worth remarking
161
that the legislation leaves felons’ voting rights unclear.
V. CONCLUSION
California’s 2011 corrections realignment legislation placed felons under
162
varying degrees of local control. It provided that county jails, rather than state

153. Id. at 25–26.
154. See id. at 26 (“[T]wo similar felons in two different counties may have very different experiences:
One may have the misfortune to be [in a county with a jail population cap and thus be] convicted of a more
serious crime and . . . [sentenced to] state prison [while] his counterpart in another county” without a jail
population cap is convicted of a less serious crime and sentenced to a jail term.).
155. TAYLOR, STATUS REPORT, supra note 131, at 6.
156. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a) (“A person may not be . . . denied
equal protection of the laws . . . .”).
157. See discussion infra Appendix A (discussing felon sentencing to county jail).
158. See infra text accompanying notes 294–95 (discussing the conduct credit earning ratio for jail
inmates under corrections realignment).
159. However, the California Supreme Court has already ruled equal protection concerns do not
mandate that courts retroactively apply statutes that increase conduct credits. California v. Brown III, 278 P.3d
1182, 1191–93 (Cal. 2012).
160. See MISCZYNSKI, supra note 3, at 24 (“State correctional officers and parole officers have legal
immunity when performing their official duties. For example, they cannot be sued individually if a prisoner is
injured or if an inadequately supervised parolee commits a new crime. But local officials do not have the same
level of protection. This could mean controversy about which level of government should properly bear the
financial responsibility of corrections realignment litigation.”).
161. See generally BYERS, supra note 24, at 73–77 (discussing felons’ voting rights post-realignment).
162. See discussion supra Part II (discussing the changes wrought by the corrections realignment
legislation); see also discussion infra Appendices A–B (discussing the corrections realignment legislation in
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prisons, incarcerate low-level felons. It provided that counties, rather than the
164
state, supervise mid-level felons upon their release from prison. Finally, it
provided that county jails incarcerate high-level felons who violate their parole
165
166
conditions. The legislation was embodied in a budgetary realignment and
seems likely to function in both a budget-balancing and a prison-population167
168
reducing capacity. However, it may also lead to unintended consequences.
Whatever its ultimate effects, the 2011 corrections realignment marked a
dramatic turning point in how California handles felons. Its reverberations will
undoubtedly be felt in the state for years to come.

detail).
163. See discussion supra Part II.B.1 (defining low-level felons and indicating corrections realignment
required counties to incarcerate low-level felons); see also discussion infra Appendix A (discussing felon
incarceration post-realignment).
164. See discussion supra Part II.B.2 (defining mid-level felons and indicating corrections realignment
required counties to supervise mid-level felons); see also discussion infra Appendix B (discussing felon postrelease supervision laws following realignment).
165. See discussion supra Part II.B.3 (defining high-level felons and indicating corrections realignment
required counties to incarcerate parole violators); see also discussion infra Appendix B (discussing parole
revocation sentencing post-realignment).
166. See discussion supra Part III.A.3 (indicating corrections realignment was embodied in California’s
2011 corrections realignment).
167. See discussion supra Part IV.A (indicating the likely effects of corrections realignment).
168. See discussion supra Part IV.B (noting the possible adverse consequences of corrections
realignment).
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APPENDIX A: CALIFORNIA’S FELON INCARCERATION LAWS BEFORE AND AFTER
THE 2011 CORRECTIONS REALIGNMENT
This Appendix considers California’s felon incarceration laws before and
after the passage of California’s 2011 corrections realignment legislation. The
changes discussed in this Appendix functioned to reroute the flow of low-level
felons from state prisons to county jails.
A. California’s Felon Incarceration Laws Before Corrections Realignment
Before corrections realignment, state law generally provided that executed
felony sentences be served only in state prisons. This Section begins by briefly
noting how California defines felonies. It continues by noting why different types
of sentences pervade California’s statutes. It then outlines the state’s felony
sentencing procedure.
1. Felonies Defined
Understanding felon incarceration laws in California begins with
understanding what a felony is. Existing law defines crimes by the harshness of
their penalties. A “felony” is by definition any crime that is punishable by a
169
period of incarceration exceeding one year in length. Before corrections

169. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 18 (West 1999) (defining felonies as offenses punishable by
imprisonment for a minimum of sixteen months in state prison), with id. § 19 (defining misdemeanors as
offenses punishable by terms of up to six months in county jail), and id. § 19.6 (defining infractions as offenses
not punishable by incarceration). It should be remarked California law includes crimes—called “wobblers”—
that are presumptively felonies but which may also be punished as misdemeanors. Ewing v. California, 538
U.S. 11, 16–17 (2003) (“[A]‘wobbler’ is presumptively a felony and ‘remains a felony except when the
discretion is actually exercised’ to make the crime a misdemeanor. . . . [P]rosecutors may exercise their
discretion to charge a ‘wobbler’ as either a felony or a misdemeanor. Likewise, . . . trial courts have discretion
to reduce a ‘wobbler’ charged as a felony to a misdemeanor either before preliminary examination or at
sentencing . . . .” (citations omitted) (quoting California v. Williams, 27 Cal. 2d 220, 229, 163 P.2d 692, 696
(1945))); see also id. at 17 (indicating that, when deciding whether to reduce a wobbler from a felony to a
misdemeanor, a trial “court may consider ‘those factors that direct similar sentencing decisions,’ such as ‘the
nature and circumstances of the offense, the defendant's appreciation of and attitude toward the offense, . . .
[and] the general objectives of sentencing’” (quoting People v. Super. Ct. ex rel. Alvarez, 14 Cal. 4th 968, 978,
928 P.2d 1171, 1177–78 (1997))). For examples of wobblers, see PENAL § 473 (West 2010) (prescribing
“imprisonment in [a] state prison, or by imprisonment in [a] county jail for not more than one year” for
forgery); id. § 273.5 (West 2008 & Supp. 2012) (prescribing “imprisonment in [a] state prison for two, three, or
four years, or in a county jail for not more than one year, or by a fine of up to six thousand dollars ($6,000) or
by both that fine and imprisonment” for inflicting corporal injury on a spouse or mate). Sometimes felonies that
are not wobblers are described as “straight” felonies. See Legal Definition of a Felony in California Law,
SHOUSE L. GRP., http://www.shouselaw.com/felony.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review) (“A ‘straight’ felony is one that can only be charged and sentenced as a felony.”).
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realignment, state law provided that executed felony sentences could be served
170
only in state prisons.
2. A Felony Sentencing System Divided Against Itself: Making Sense of the
Mix of Indeterminate and Determinate Sentences in California Law
Understanding the felon incarceration law in California does not end at
knowing what a felony is. It is also important to know that two very different
categories of felony sentences pervade existing California law. A few felony
171
172
sentencing statutes prescribe open-ended sentences such as “15 years to life,”
affording virtually limitless sentencing flexibility. Most statutes, though,
prescribe closed-ended sentences such as “two, three, or four years,” confining
173
sentencing discretion to a universe of three choices. California’s felony
sentencing system comprises both open-ended (“indeterminate”) and closedended (“determinate”) prison terms because the state has had both indeterminate
and determinate sentencing regimes in its history.
For roughly a sixty-year stretch that began in 1917, California embraced
174
indeterminate sentencing.
Then, in 1976, California almost completely
175
abandoned its indeterminate sentencing system for determinate sentencing.
170. See PENAL § 18 (West 1999) (defining felonies as offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding
one year); id. § 19.2 (providing that a county jail could incarcerate a person for only up to one year, thus
foreclosing the possibility that felons could serve their executed felony sentences in county jails).
171. This article uses the term “felony sentencing statute” because its references are to sentencing
statutes, and sentencing statutes are sometimes distinct from the statutes substantively defining the underlying
offense. Compare id. § 187 (West 2008) (defining murder), with id. § 190 (prescribing sentences for murder).
172. See, e.g., id. § 190.05(a) (prescribing “a term of 15 years to life” for second-degree murder where
the convicted murderer has already “served a prior prison term for murder in the first or second degree”).
173. See, e.g., id. § 520 (West 2010) (prescribing a term of two, three, or four years for committing
felony extortion).
174. See 1917 Cal. Stat. ch. 527 (enacting California’s indeterminate sentencing regime); 1976 Cal. Stat.
ch. 1139 (replacing California’s indeterminate sentencing regime with a determinate sentencing one). See
generally PENAL § 1168 (West 2004) (codifying California’s indeterminate sentencing law); id. § 1170 (West
2004 & Supp. 2011) (codifying California’s determinate sentencing law). The indeterminate sentencing regime
optimized judicial sentencing discretion and incentivized prisoners’ rehabilitative efforts:
The court imposed a statutory sentence expressed as a range between a minimum and maximum
period of confinement—often life imprisonment—the offender must serve. An inmate’s actual
period of incarceration within this range was under the exclusive control of the parole authority,
which focused primarily, not on the appropriate punishment for the original offense, but on the
offender’s progress toward rehabilitation. During most of this period, . . . prisoners had no idea when
their confinement would end, until the moment the parole authority decided they were ready for
release.
In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061, 1077, 104 P.3d 783, 790 (2005).
175. The indeterminate sentencing system had come under political attack in the early 1970s. See
Joaquin Palomino, How California’s Prison Population Exploded, E. BAY EXPRESS (Apr. 11, 2012),
http://www.eastbayexpress.com/gyrobase/how-the-prison-population-exploded/Content?oid=3172693&show
FullText=true (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“Liberals thought [the indeterminate sentencing law]
wasn’t transparent enough; one person might serve six months for dealing drugs and another could serve a
lifetime for the same crime. Accusations of racial discrimination and favoritism flooded the courts.
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Today, a few remnants from the derelict indeterminate system remain. The
sentencing statutes for a handful of serious felonies continue to prescribe
176
indeterminate sentences. First-degree murder, to take what is perhaps the most
177
obvious example, remains punishable by “a term of 25 years to life.” However,
reflective of the change in sentencing regimes, the vast majority of the state’s
178
felonies include sentencing “triads,” which comprise precise “lower, middle,
179
and upper term sentence[s].” Thus, for example, the sentencing statute for first180
degree burglary prescribes an incarceration term of two, four, or six years.
Triad ranges reflect the legislatively determined seriousness of the crimes to
181
which they are attached. Thus, felony extortion, a felony determined by the
legislature to be relatively minor, is punishable by two, three, or four years of
182
incarceration. Conversely, felony carjacking, a more serious felony, carries a
183
sentence of three, five, or nine years.

Conservatives . . . believ[ed indeterminate sentencing] produced lenient sentences. There also were accusations
that the state released inmates for political and social reasons.”). The state legislature responded by enacting
California’s determinate sentencing law. See 1976 Cal. Stat. ch. 1139 (enacting California’s determinate
sentencing law). The determinate sentencing law removed judicial sentencing discretion and dis-incentivized
prisoners’ rehabilitative efforts by
largely abandon[ing the indeterminate sentencing] system. The [determinate sentencing law]
implemented the Legislature’s finding that “the purpose of imprisonment for crime is punishment,” a
goal “best served by terms proportionate to the seriousness of the offense,” with provision for
sentence “uniform[ity]” for similar offenses. . . . [Under the determinate sentencing law, an] offender
must serve [his or her] entire term, less applicable sentence credits, within prison walls, [and] then
must be released for a further period of supervised parole.
Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1078, 104 P.3d at 790–91 (citations omitted).
176. After California switched to determinate sentencing, “certain serious offenders, including
‘noncapital’ murderers (i.e., those murderers not punishable by death or life without parole), remain[ed] subject
to indeterminate sentences. . . .” Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1078, 104 P.3d at 791. See generally CAL. LEGIS.
ANALYST’S OFF., OVERVIEW OF CUNNINGHAM V. CALIFORNIA AND RELATED LEGISLATION 1 (2010), available
at http://www.lao.ca.gov/handouts/crimjust/2010/Cunningham_11_9_10.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (reporting that, as of November 2010, “[a]bout 20 percent of state prison inmates [were] serving
indeterminate life sentences”).
177. PENAL § 190(a).
178. Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 277 (2007). See generally CAL. LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF.,
supra note 176, at 1 (reporting that, as of November 2010, “[r]oughly 77 percent of state prison inmates [were]
serving determinate sentences”).
179. Cunningham, 549 U.S. at 277.
180. PENAL § 461(a) (West 2010).
181. See Dansky, supra note 80, at 67 (explaining that California’s determinate sentencing law
categorizes “offenses . . . into [five total] degrees of seriousness . . . [and] assign[s each level] three definite
terms (the ‘triads’)”); PENAL § 1170(a)(1) (indicating a felony’s prescribed sentencing triad reflects the state
legislature’s assessment of that felony’s seriousness).
182. PENAL § 520.
183. Id. § 215(b) (West 2008).
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3. Penal Code Section 1170: California’s Felony Sentencing Procedure
Under the Determinate Sentencing Law
To understand California’s felon incarceration laws, it is important to know
how felony sentence lengths are determined. Since California uses a determinate
sentencing system, judges adhere to the sentencing guidelines contained in Penal
184
Code Section 1170—California’s determinate sentencing law (DSL) —to
185
determine the appropriate sentence to impose on convicted felons. Generally, a
sentencing judge must first check whether the applicable felony sentencing
statute prescribes a determinate sentence, an indeterminate sentence, or no
sentence at all. If the relevant felony sentencing statute prescribes an
indeterminate sentence length, the judge selects and imposes the appropriate
186
indeterminate sentence. If the applicable felony sentencing statute prescribes no
sentence at all, the judge selects and imposes the appropriate term from a range
187
that includes sixteen months, two years, or three years.
If the applicable felony sentencing statute prescribes a determinate sentence,
the sentencing judge must determine whether the state legislature has provided
the felon with an alternative sentencing disposition to a prison sentence, such as
188
jail or probation. If the state legislature has provided for an alternative
189
disposition to a prison sentence, the sentencing judge imposes it. If, however,
the state legislature has not provided for an alternative disposition to a prison
sentence, the sentencing judge determines at his or her discretion which of the
three determinate sentence lengths prescribed by the statute is the most
190
appropriate to impose.

184. Id. § 1170.
185. Id. § 1170(a).
186. See id. § 1170(a)(3) (“Nothing in [the determinate sentencing law] shall affect any provision of law
that . . . expressly provides for” an indeterminate sentence.); see also id. § 1168(b) (providing that, for any
person sentenced under a statute unaffected by the determinate sentencing law, “the court imposing the sentence
shall” provide an indeterminate sentence).
187. See id. § 18 (“Except in cases where a different punishment is prescribed by any law of this state,
every offense declared to be a felony, or to be punishable by imprisonment in a state prison, is punishable by
imprisonment in any of the state prisons for 16 months, or two or three years . . . .”).
188. See id. § 1170(a)(3) (“In any case in which the punishment prescribed by statute for a person
convicted of a public offense is a term of imprisonment in the state prison of any specification of three time
periods, the court shall sentence the defendant to one of the terms of imprisonment specified unless the
convicted person is given any other disposition provided by law, including a fine, jail, probation, or the
suspension of imposition or execution of sentence . . . .”); accord id. (“Nothing in [the determinate sentencing
law] shall affect any provision of law . . . that authorizes or restricts the granting of probation or suspending the
execution or imposition of sentence . . . .”). See generally id. § 1203(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2011) (defining
“probation” as “the suspension of the imposition or execution of a sentence and the order of conditional and
revocable release in the community under the supervision of a [county] probation officer”).
189. Id. § 1170(a)(3).
190. See id. § 1170(b) (“When a judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed and the statute specifies
three possible terms, the choice of the appropriate term shall rest within the sound discretion of the court.”).
This was not always the case; in its original sentencing instructions, California’s DSL directed a sentencing
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B. California’s Felon Incarceration Laws After Corrections Realignment
Under the 2011 corrections realignment, state law provides that executed
sentences for certain felonies are eligible to be served in county jails. This
Section notes how the legislation recast hundreds of non-serious, non-violent,
and non-sexual felonies as “county jail felonies.” It then discusses how judges
determine county jail felony sentence lengths. It moves on to a discussion of the
county jail felony disqualifiers. This Section concludes by examining how judges
impose county jail felony sentences.
1. Penal Code Section 1170, Subdivision (h): Recasting Hundreds of
Felonies as County Jail Felonies
California’s 2011 corrections realignment legislation added subdivision (h),
paragraphs (1) through (5), to Penal Code Section 1170—California’s
determinate sentencing law—and then added cross-references to that new
191
subdivision to about five-hundred statutes prescribing sentences for crimes
deemed non-serious, non-violent, and non-sexual by the legislature. If a felony
cross-references Penal Code Section 1170(h), it is eligible, subject to some
disqualifiers discussed below, to be served in county jail. We may properly deem
192
these felonies “county jail felonies.”
judge to select the middle term of the applicable sentencing triad, unless (1) he or she found mitigating
circumstances, in which case the sentencing judge would select the lower term, or (2) he or she found
aggravating circumstances, in which case the sentencing judge would select the upper term. Cunningham v.
California, 549 U.S. 270, 277 (2007). However, the United States Supreme Court ruled those instructions to be
unconstitutional because it interpreted them to mean that the maximum allowable prison sentence in any given
sentencing triad, as determined by the state legislature, was the middle term, and any sentence imposed above
the maximum allowable must, in order to comport with the Sixth Amendment’s right to a trial by jury, be based
on a jury’s findings rather than a judge’s independent determination. Id. at 293. See generally U.S. CONST.
amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a . . . trial[] by a[] . . . jury . . . .”).
About “[t]wo months after the [Court’s] decision . . . , the Legislature enacted [Senate Bill 40], which . . .
modified California’s determinate sentencing law to ensure that when there are three possible terms of
imprisonment, the choice of the appropriate term would ‘rest within the sound discretion of the court,’” CAL.
LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF., supra note 176, at 4, thus excising any implication that the middle term is the
maximum allowable sentence. See 2007 Cal. Stat. ch. 3 (codifying SB 40). See generally Dansky, supra note
80, at 70 n.145 (“The California Supreme Court [subsequently] amended the Criminal Rules . . . to provide
sentencing courts with guidance in imposing sentence.”); CAL. R. CT. 4.420 (providing the California Supreme
Court’s amended sentencing rules).
191. Realignment AB 109 in California, SHOUSE L. GRP., http://www.shouselaw.com/realignment.html
(last visited Oct. 8, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
192. BYERS, supra note 24, at 10. For examples of non-serious, non-violent, and non-sexual felonies
transformed into county jail felonies, see CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2052 (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15)
(prescribing sentence for unlicensed medical practice); id. § 6126 (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15) (prescribing
sentence for unlicensed legal practice); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 7054 (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15) (prescribing
sentence for using school property for political activities); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 18521 (amended by 2011 Stat.
ch. 15) (prescribing sentence for bribing electors); id. § 18680 (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15) (prescribing
sentence for misusing campaign funds); CAL. FIN. CODE § 3510 (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15) (prescribing
sentence for price fixing); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11358 (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15) (prescribing
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2. Penal Code Section 1170, Subdivision (h), Paragraphs (1) and (2):
Determining County Jail Felony Sentence Lengths
Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (h), paragraphs (1) and (2), provide
that, in general, a person sentenced on or after October 1, 2011, for committing a
county jail felony, is eligible to serve his or her court-imposed incarceration term
in a county jail rather than in a state prison. Pursuant to Penal Code section
1170(h)(1), if a county jail felony’s sentencing statute does not prescribe a term
of incarceration, the default triad range of sixteen months, two years, or three
193
years applies. Pursuant to Penal Code section 1170(h)(2), if a county jail
felony’s sentencing statute prescribes a triad sentencing range, the underlying
felony is punishable by a county jail sentence for up to the length of the upper
194
term.

sentence for illegally cultivating marijuana); CAL. INS. CODE § 11760 (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15)
(prescribing sentence for insurance fraud); CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE § 145 (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15)
(prescribing sentence for insurrection); CAL. PENAL CODE § 76 (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15) (prescribing
sentence for threatening elected officials); id. § 182 (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15) (prescribing sentence for
conspiracy); id. § 193 (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15) (prescribing sentence for voluntary manslaughter); id. §
237 (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15) (prescribing sentence for false imprisonment); id. § 245(a)(1) (amended by
2011 Stat. ch. 15) (prescribing sentence for assault by means of force “likely to produce great bodily injury”);
id. § 271 (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15) (prescribing sentence for deserting a child with intent to abandon); id.
§ 273d (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15) (prescribing sentence for felony child abuse); id. § 368 (amended by
2011 Stat. ch. 15) (prescribing sentence for crimes against elders and dependent adults); id. § 399.5 (amended
by 2011 Stat. ch. 15) (prescribing sentence for having custody of an attack dog); id. § 422.7 (amended by 2011
Stat. ch. 15) (prescribing sentence for hate crimes); id. § 461 (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15) (prescribing
sentence for burglary); id. § 530.5 (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15) (prescribing sentence for identity theft); id. §
532f (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15) (prescribing sentence for mortgage fraud); id. § 597 (amended by 2011
Stat. ch. 15) (prescribing sentence for animal cruelty); id. § 626.9 (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15) (prescribing
sentence for violating the Gun Free School Zone Act); id. § 631 (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15) (prescribing
sentence for wiretapping); id. § 664 (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15) (prescribing sentence for criminal
attempts); id. § 12025 (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15) (prescribing sentence for carrying a concealed firearm);
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 5097.99 (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15) (prescribing sentence for unlawfully
possessing “any Native American artifacts or human remains”); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 19708 (amended by
2011 Stat. ch. 15) (prescribing sentence for tax evasion). The corrections realignment legislation amended the
Vehicle Code to “provide[] that all felonies in the Vehicle Code that do not specify a term in state prison are”
typically county jail felonies. BYERS, supra note 24, at 26; see also CAL. VEH. CODE § 42000 (amended by
2011 Stat. ch. 15) (providing that Vehicle Code felonies are county jail felonies). In addition, the corrections
realignment legislation made various conforming changes to the Penal Code, such as by amending California’s
statutory definition of a felony to provide that the term refers, not only to offenses “punishable . . . by
imprisonment in [a] state prison,” but also to “imprisonment in a county jail,” PENAL § 17(a) (amended by 2011
Stat. ch. 15), and by providing that county jail sentences may exceed one year in length. Id. § 19.2 (amended by
2011 Stat. ch. 15).
193. PENAL § 1170(h)(1) (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by
2011 Stat. ch. 136, amended by 2011–12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 361).
194. Id. § 1170(h)(2) (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by 2011
Stat. ch. 136, amended by 2011–12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 361).
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3. Penal Code Section 1170, Subdivision (h), Paragraph (3): The County
Jail Disqualifiers
Despite the operation of Penal Code section 1170(h)(1) and (h)(2), not every
individual sentenced for committing a county jail felony can serve his or her
executed sentence in a county jail. Penal Code section 1170(h)(3) announces
several county jail disqualifiers. Specifically, it indicates that any felon with a
current or prior serious or violent felony conviction, a current or prior felony or
misdemeanor conviction requiring registration as a sex offender, or a sentence
enhancement based on fraud or embezzlement, is disqualified from serving his or
195
her executed sentence in a county jail. Penal Code section 1170.1(a) establishes
195. Id. § 1170(h)(3) (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by 2011
Stat. ch. 136, amended by 2011–12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 361). See generally id. §
1192.7(c) (West 2004 & Supp. 2011) (defining serious felonies); id. § 667.5(c)(1)–(23) (defining violent
felonies); id. § 290 (West 2008) (specifying required sex registrants); id. § 186.11 (West 1999 & Supp. 2011)
(describing sentence enhancements for fraud and embezzlement). Incidentally, the corrections realignment
legislation transformed “a small number of [sex] registerable offenses, and a small number of offenses that are
always, or almost always, serious or violent felonies” into county jail felonies; however, “those [felonies]
remain, by operation of . . . [Penal Code section 1170](h)(3), State Prison Felonies.” BYERS, supra note 24, at
16–17; see generally id. at 120 (noting that the corrections realignment legislation transformed Penal Code
sections 288.2, 647.6, and 653f(c), “three mandatory [sex]-registerable offenses,” into county jail felonies); id.
(noting that the corrections realignment legislation transformed Penal Code section 12303 and Vehicle Code
sections 23104, 23105, and 23109.10, “felonies that are normally, or often, serious felonies,” into county jail
felonies). Further, “a number of crimes . . . categorized as . . . non-violent, non-serious, and non-sex
offenses . . . still require that offenders serve their sentences in State prisons. These crimes are also known as
the Exclusions.” Public Safety Realignment, CAL. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS & REHABILITATION,
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/realignment/AB-109-crime-exclusion-list.html (last visited June 13, 2012) (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review). “Their exclusion status is due to their enactment as majority-vote bills wherein
voters decided that tougher and longer sentences were required for certain kinds of offenses.” Id. See generally
Criminal Justice Realignment Will Affect Felony Sentencing, County Jail Credit, Postrelease Supervision and
Parole, CONTINUING EDUC. OF THE BAR, http://ceb.com/lawalerts/Criminal-Justice-Realignment.asp (last
visited June 22, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (explaining that many of the excluded offenses
“involve a weapon or injury”). The exclusions, as noted on the AB 109 Final Crime Exclusion List, CAL. DEP’T
OF CORRECTIONS & REHABILITATION (July 15, 2011), http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/realignment/AB-109-final-crimeexclusion-list.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) webpage, are as follows: ELEC. § 18501
(prescribing sentence for being a public official who aids and abets voter fraud); CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 1090,
1097 (prescribing sentence for conflict of interest by public officer or employee); id. § 1195 (prescribing
sentence for taking subordinate pay), id. § 1855 (prescribing sentence for destroying documents); HEALTH &
SAFETY §§ 11353, 11354 (prescribing sentence for employing a minor to sell controlled substance); id. §
11361(a), (b) (prescribing sentence for employing a minor to sell marijuana); id. § 11370.1 (prescribing
sentence for possessing a controlled substance while armed with a firearm); id. § 11380(a) (prescribing sentence
for using a minor to transport/possess/possess for sale); id. § 120291 (prescribing sentence for knowingly
exposing someone to HIV); PENAL § 67 (prescribing sentence for bribing an executive officer); id. § 68
(prescribing sentence for being an executive or ministerial officer and accepting a bribe); id. § 85 (prescribing
sentence for bribing a legislator); id. § 86 (prescribing sentence for being a legislator and accepting a bribe); id.
§§ 92–93 (prescribing sentence for judicial bribery); id. § 113 (prescribing sentence for manufacturing or
distributing false citizenship documents); id. § 114 (prescribing sentence for using false citizenship documents);
id. § 141 (prescribing sentence for being a peace officer and intentionally planting evidence); id. § 165
(prescribing sentence for being a local official and accepting a bribe); id. § 186.11 (prescribing sentence for
felony convictions with a Penal Code section 186.11 enhancement); id. § 186.22 (prescribing sentence for
criminal gang activity); id. § 186.26 (prescribing sentence for street gang activity); id. § 186.33 (prescribing
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an additional county jail disqualifier: if a person incurs convictions for at least
two felonies, and one of the offenses prescribes a prison sentence, the convicted
196
felon will serve an aggregate sentence in a prison, even if one of the other
197
offenses is a county jail felony.
4. Penal Code Section 1170, Subdivision (h), Paragraph (5): The
Sentencing Procedure for County Jail Felonies
The 2011 corrections realignment legislation requires judges to determine
whether any individual who incurs a county jail felony conviction has one of the

sentence for gang registration violation); id. § 191.5(c) (prescribing sentence for committing vehicular
manslaughter while intoxicated); id. § 222 (prescribing sentence for administering stupefying drugs to assist in
the commission of a felony); id. § 243.7 (prescribing sentence for battering a juror); id. § 243.9 (prescribing
sentence for gassing a peace officer or local detention facility employee); id. § 245(d) (prescribing sentence for
assaulting a peace officer); id. § 266a (prescribing sentence for abducting or procuring by fraudulent
inducement for prostitution); id. § 266e (prescribing sentence for purchasing of a person for purposes of
prostitution or placing a person for immoral purposes); id. § 266f (prescribing sentence for selling a person for
immoral purposes); id. § 266h (prescribing sentence for pimping and pimping a minor); id. § 266i (prescribing
sentence for pandering and pandering with a minor); id. § 266j (prescribing sentence for procuring a child under
age sixteen for lewd or lascivious acts); id. § 272(b) (prescribing sentence for persuading, luring, or transporting
a minor under thirteen); id. § 273a (prescribing sentence for felony child abuse likely to produce great bodily
injury or death); id. § 273ab (prescribing sentence for assault resulting in death of a child under age 8); id. §
273.5 (prescribing sentence for felony domestic violence); id. § 298.2 (prescribing sentence for knowingly
facilitating the collection of wrongfully attributed DNA specimens); id. § 299.5 (prescribing sentence for the
wrongful use of DNA specimens); id. § 347 (prescribing sentence for poisoning or adulterating food, drink,
medicine, pharmaceutical product, spring, well, reservoir, or public water supply); id. § 368b (prescribing
sentence for felony physical abuse of an elder or dependent adult); id. § 417(c) (prescribing sentence for
brandishing a firearm in the presence of a peace officer); id. § 417.8 (prescribing sentence for brandishing a
firearm or deadly weapon to avoid arrest); id. § 424 (prescribing sentence for misappropriating public funds);
id. § 452 (prescribing sentence for unlawfully causing a fire that causes an inhabited structure or inhabited
property to burn); id. §§ 504, 514 (prescribing sentence for embezzling public funds); id. § 598c (prescribing
sentence for possessing or importing horsemeat); id. § 598d (prescribing sentence for selling horsemeat); id. §
646.9 (prescribing sentence for felony stalking); id. § 653f(b) (prescribing sentence for solicitation for murder);
id. §§ 12021, 12021.1 (prescribing sentence for possessing a firearm while prohibited from doing so); id. §
12303.2 (prescribing sentence for possessing an explosive or destructive device); id. § 4532 (prescribing
sentence for escape); VEH. § 2800.2 (prescribing sentence for evading a peace officer by driving in a willful or
wanton disregard for safety of persons or property); id. § 2800.3 (prescribing sentence for evading a peace
officer and causing death or serious bodily injury); id. § 20001 (prescribing sentence for hit and run driving
causing death or injury); id. § 23153 (prescribing sentence for felony driving under the influence causing
injury).
196. See generally PENAL § 1170.1(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2011) (providing that an aggregate sentence
is equal to “the sum of the principal term, the subordinate term, and any additional term imposed for applicable
enhancements for prior convictions, prior prison terms, and” sentence enhancements); id. (providing that, in any
aggregate prison sentence, the “principal term” is the longest imposed term, including enhancements, whereas
the “subordinate term” is “one-third of the middle term of imprisonment prescribed for each other felony
conviction . . . , and shall include one-third of the term imposed for any specific enhancements applicable to
those subordinate offenses”); id. § 1170.1(d) (“If an enhancement is punishable by one of three terms, the court
shall, in its discretion, impose the term that best serves the interest of justice, and state the reasons for its
sentence choice on the record at the time of sentencing.”).
197. Id. § 1170.1(a) (amended by 2011–12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 361).
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county jail disqualifiers. If the felon has a disqualifier, the judge’s task is to
199
impose sentence in accordance with existing state law. If the felon does not
have a jail disqualifier, the sentencing judge’s task is more involved.
First, the judge must select and impose the appropriate term contained in the
200
felony sentencing statute. From there, he or she has two general sentencing
201
options. The judge can order the felon to serve the entirety of the imposed term
of incarceration in a county jail and forego any period of post-release
202
supervision. Alternatively, the judge can impose a “split sentence”—that is,
impose a sentence divided into an executed and a suspended segment such that
the felon serves a beginning part of his or her sentence in a county jail and then a
203
concluding part under mandatory post-release community supervision. It
appears judges opting to impose split sentences must also specify the respective
204
executed and suspended sentence lengths.

198. Id. § 1170(h)(3) (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by 2011
Stat. ch. 136, amended by 2011–12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 361).
199. Of course, even if the felon has a disqualifier, the sentencing judge has discretion to impose a
sentence other than a state prison term. Id. § 1170(h)(4) (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat.
ch. 39, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 136, amended by 2011–12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12, amended by 2011 Stat. ch.
361).
200. The corrections realignment legislation retained “[t]he triad sentencing system of the Determinate
Sentencing Law,” along with most of the triads already prescribed in the affected felonies. BYERS, supra note
24, at 16. It thus appears to comport with existing sentencing rules. Id. at 69.
201. PENAL § 1170(h)(5) (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by
2011 Stat. ch. 136, amended by 2011–12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 361).
202. Id. § 1170(h)(5)(A) (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by
2011 Stat. ch. 136, amended by 2011–12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 361).
203. Id. § 1170(h)(5)(B) (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by
2011 Stat. ch. 136, amended by 2011–12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 361). During the
mandatory supervision period, the supervisee cannot earn conduct credits. Id. For a discussion of conduct
credits, see infra text accompanying notes 272–78.
204. BYERS, supra note 24, at 37.
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APPENDIX B: CALIFORNIA’S POST-RELEASE SUPERVISION LAWS BEFORE AND
AFTER THE 2011 CORRECTIONS REALIGNMENT
This Appendix considers California’s post-release supervision laws prior
and subsequent to the passage of California’s 2011 corrections realignment
legislation. The changes discussed in this Appendix functioned to reroute the
post-incarceration flow of mid-level felons from state-administered parole to
county probation. They also increased the difficulty of returning parolees to
prison for committing parole violations.
A. California’s Post-Release Supervision Laws Before Corrections Realignment
Before corrections realignment, state law mandated a period of post-release
supervision for all felons. Furthermore, the state conducted parole revocation
hearings, and parole violators typically served their revocation sentences in state
prison. This Section discusses the parole system, including the calculus for
determining parole lengths. This Section also discusses parole revocation laws
prior to the 2011 corrections realignment.
1. Mandatory State-Administered Parole for All Felons
Before corrections realignment, state law required all felons, after completing
their prison sentences, to go on a period of state-administered, post-release
205
supervision called “parole.” Under existing law, the CDCR retains legal
206
custody over every felon on parole. A felon generally serves his or her parole
term in the county of his or her “last legal residence . . . prior to . . .
207
incarceration.” However, the CDCR can release the felon onto parole in a
205. PENAL § 3000(a)(1) (West 2011). See generally Prison Law Office v. Koenig, 186 Cal. App. 3d
560, 566, 233 Cal. Rptr. 590, 594 (1st Dist. 1986) (“Parole is the conditional release of a prisoner who has
already served part of his or her state prison sentence. Once released from confinement, a prisoner on parole is
not free from legal restraint, but is constructively a prisoner in the legal custody of state prison authorities until
officially discharged from parole.”). But cf. PENAL § 1170(a)(3) (West Supp. 2011) (providing that, if a
prisoner’s conduct credits equal his or her “total sentence, including both confinement time and the period of
parole,” the prisoner will not go on parole). For a discussion of conduct credits, see infra text accompanying
notes 272–78.
206. PENAL § 3056 (West 2011). This means that CDCR parole officers supervise parolees. PRISON
LAW OFFICE, THE PAROLEE RIGHTS HANDBOOK 4 (2010), available at http://www.prisonlaw.com/pdfs/Parole
Manual,Mar10wforms3.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). See generally Explanation of California
Parole Law, SHOUSE L. GRP., http://www.shouselaw.com/parolehub.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2012) (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review) (indicating parole officers “report directly to the [California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation’s] Board of Parole Hearings,” “prepare plans and recommendations for
[parolees] prior to release,” “help their parolees arrange for services such as employment, housing, medical care
and counseling services, and social activities”); id. (indicating parole officers also conduct six types of parole
supervision—intensive re-entry, regular re-entry, specialized caseloads, case management supervision,
electronic supervision, and subsistence and personal care).
207. PENAL § 3003(a).
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different county if doing so serves the public interest. Once the CDCR
determines into which county it will release a felon, it must provide specified
209
information to the county’s law enforcement agencies. Once the CDCR
releases a felon on parole, it may require the parolee to wear an electronic
210
211
monitoring device or to be under continuous electronic monitoring.
2. Parole Lengths
Under existing state law, the CDCR’s Board of Parole Hearings (BPH)
212
(California’s parole authority) determines “[t]he length of [a person’s] parole
208. Id. § 3003(b). The paroling authority must consider several factors before making its decision,
“giving the greatest weight to the protection of the victim and the safety of the community.” Id. Those factors
are: “[t]he need to protect [any person’s] life or safety,” id. § 3003(b)(1); “[p]ublic concern that would reduce
the chance that the inmate's parole would be successfully completed,” id. § 3003(b)(2); “[t]he verified existence
of a work offer, or an educational or vocational training program,” id. § 3003(b)(3); “[t]he existence of family
in another county with whom the inmate has maintained strong ties and whose support would increase the
chance that the inmate's parole would be successfully completed,” id. § 3003(b)(4); and “[t]he lack of necessary
outpatient treatment programs for parolees receiving [mental health care] treatment.” Id. § 3003(b)(5). Parolees
convicted of a violent felony defined in Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (C), paragraphs (1)–(7) and (16),
or of a felony involving “great bodily injury on any person other than an accomplice,” cannot “be returned to a
location within 35 miles of the . . . residence of a victim of, or a witness to, [the] violent felony” whenever “the
victim or witness . . . request[s] additional distance in the placement of [parolee], and . . . the Board of Parole
Hearings or the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation finds that there is a need to protect the life, safety,
or well-being of a victim or witness.” Id. § 3003(f). Similarly, parolees convicted of “an offense involving
stalking shall not be returned to a location within 35 miles of the victim's actual residence or place of
employment if the victim or witness has requested additional distance in the placement of the [parolee] . . . , and
. . . the Board of Parole Hearings or the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation finds that there is a need
to protect the life, safety, or well-being of the victim.” Id. § 3003(h). Parolees convicted of lewd or lascivious
acts or continuous sexual abuse of a child cannot reside while on parole “within one-half mile of any public or
private school.” Id. § 3003(g). Finally, a California felon can be paroled out-of-state. Id. § 3003(j).
209. Id. § 3003(e)(1). Required information includes: the parolee’s name, id. § 3003(e)(1)(A); birthdate,
id. § 3003(e)(1)(B); physical appearance, id. § 3003(e)(1)(C); starting and ending parole dates, id. §
3003(e)(1)(D); “[r]egistration status, if . . . [the parolee must] register . . . [for having committed] a controlled
substance, sex, or arson offense,” id. § 3003(e)(1)(E); “California Criminal Information Number, FBI number,
social security number, and driver’s license number,” id. § 3003(e)(1)(F); county of parole, id. § 3003(e)(1)(G);
street address, id. § 3003(e)(1)(J); supervising officer, id. § 3003(e)(1)(K); physical “scars, marks, and tattoos,”
id. § 3003(e)(1)(H); commitment offense or offenses, id. § 3003(e)(1)(I); photograph and fingerprints, id. §
3003(e)(1)(L); and “[a] geographic coordinate for the parolee’s residence location for use with a Geographical
Information System (GIS) or comparable computer program.” Id. § 3003(e)(1)(M). See generally id. §
3003(e)(2) (“The information required . . . shall come from the statewide parolee database.”); id. § 3003(e)(3)
(“All of the information . . . shall be provided utilizing a computer-to-computer transfer in a format usable by a
desktop computer system. The transfer of this information shall be continually available to local law
enforcement agencies upon request.”).
210. Id. § 3004.
211. Id. § 3010; see also id. §§ 3010–10.9 (discussing continuous electronic monitoring and
distinguishing a “continuous electronic monitoring device” from an “electronic monitoring device”).
212. See generally About CDCR: Divisions and Boards: The Board of Parole Hearings (BPH), CAL.
DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS & REHABILITATION, http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/BOPH/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2012) (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“The Board of Parole Hearings (BPH) conducts parole consideration
hearings, parole rescission hearings, parole revocation hearings and parole progress hearings for adult inmates
and parolees under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.”).
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period . . . [based] on the type and date of the criminal conviction for which the
213
person is on parole.”
a. Parole Lengths for Felons Sentenced to Indeterminate Terms
214

Under existing law, the parole length for a life inmate whose commitment
215
offense was first- or second-degree murder is the remainder of his or her
216
lifetime. Likewise, the parole length for a life inmate whose commitment
217
offense was a specified sexual felony is the rest of his or her life. Before
corrections realignment, the parole length for a person who is required to register
218
as a sex offender for specific sexual felonies was twenty years. Under current
law, the parole length for a life inmate is ten years with a maximum of fifteen
years if the commitment offense was kidnapping in order to commit rape or

213. PRISON LAW OFFICE, supra note 205, at 24. See generally PENAL § 3000(b)(6) (indicating the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation computes an individual’s parole period is “from the
date of initial parole”). If a person absconds from parole, the time he or she absconded does not count toward
the completion of his or her parole period. See id. (“Time during which parole is suspended because the prisoner
has absconded or has been returned to custody as a parole violator shall not be credited toward any period of
parole unless the prisoner is found not guilty of the parole violation.”).
214. As used in this article, the term “life inmate” simply refers to a felon sentenced to an indeterminate
life term (for example, “twenty-five-years-to-life”). For more information on indeterminate sentences and
sentencing, see supra note 174.
215. As used in this article, the term “commitment offense” simply refers to the offense for which a
convicted offender began his or her current period of institutional confinement. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
116 (3d pocket ed. 2006) (defining “commitment” as, inter alia, [t]he act of confining a person in a prison . . .
or other institution”).
216. PENAL § 3000.1(a)(1). But see id. § 3000.1(b) (indicating life inmates whose commitment offense
was first-degree murder are eligible for discharge from parole after satisfactorily completing seven years of
parole); id. (indicating life inmates whose commitment offense was second-degree murder are eligible for
discharge from parole after completing five years of violation-free parole). Prior to corrections realignment, the
Board of Parole Hearings had the authority to retain life inmates whose commitment offense was first- or
second-degree murder on parole for good cause, and, if retained on parole, those life inmates had the right to a
parole hearing—to be conducted by the Board of Parole Hearings—every year following retention. Id.
217. PENAL § 3000.1(a)(2). See generally id. § 667.61(j)(1)–(2), (l), (m) (West Supp. 2011) (defining
the specified sexual felonies); id. § 269 (West 2008) (defining kidnapping a minor less than fourteen years old
with the intent to commit aggravated sexual assault); id. § 288.7 (West 2008) (defining sexual intercourse or
sodomy with a child ten years old or younger); id. § 667.51(c) (West 2010) (defining lewd or lascivious acts or
continuous sexual abuse of a child after having already accrued two specified sexual priors); id. § 667.71 (West
2011) (defining “habitual sexual offender”).
218. Id. § 3000(b)(4)(A). See generally id. § 261 (West 2008) (defining rape of child under fourteen); id.
§ 262 (defining spousal rape); id. § 264.1 (West Supp. 2011) (defining “rape or penetration by foreign object”);
id. § 288(a) (defining lewd or lascivious acts with a person or child “with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or
gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of that person or . . . child”); id. § 288(b)(1) (defining lewd or
lascivious acts “by use of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on
the victim or another person”); id. § 288.5 (West 2008) (defining continuous sexual abuse of a child); id. § 289
(West Supp. 2011) (defining forcible acts of sexual penetration). Before corrections realignment, the Board of
Parole Hearings could retain these sex registrants on parole for good cause. Id. If retained on parole, a sex
registrant was entitled to a parole review hearing, conducted by the Board of Parole Hearings, each year
following retention. Id. § 3000(b)(4)(B).

462

06_FAZZI_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

3/29/2013 10:12 AM

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 44
penetration by foreign object, lewd or lascivious acts, forcible sexual penetration,
lewd or lascivious acts with a child under fourteen, a recidivist sex offense, or a
219
habitual sex offense. However, before corrections realignment, these particular
life inmates were eligible for discharge after satisfactorily completing a parole
220
period of six consecutive years.
Under current law, the parole length for a life inmate whose commitment
offense was “any offense other than first or second degree murder” is five years
221
with a maximum of seven years. Finally, under current law, the parole length
for felons sentenced to any indeterminate term other than life is three years with a
222
maximum period of four years.
b. Parole Lengths for Felons Sentenced to Determinate Terms
Under existing law, the parole length for most persons sentenced under
California’s determinate sentencing law is three years with a maximum of four
223
years. However, the parole length for persons convicted of certain violent sex
224
225
226
227
crimes—specifically, rape, spousal rape, sodomy, oral copulation, lewd or

219. Id. § 3000(b)(3), (b)(6)(C) (West 2011). See generally id. § 209(b) (West 2008) (defining
kidnapping); id. § 264.1 (West Supp. 2011) (defining rape or penetration by foreign object); id. § 288 (defining
lewd or lascivious acts); id. § 289 (defining forcible sexual penetration); id. § 667.51 (West 2010) (defining
lewd or lascivious acts with a child under fourteen); id. § 667.61 (West 2011) (defining recidivist sex offenses);
id. § 667.71 (defining habitual sex offenses).
220. Id. § 3001(c).
221. Id. § 3000(b)(1), (b)(6)(B).
222. Id. § 3000(b)(1), (b)(6)(A).
223. Id. § 3000(b)(2), (b)(6)(A).
224. Id. § 667.5(c)(3) (West Supp. 2011). See generally id. § 261(a), (a)(2), (a)(6) (West 2008) (defining
rape for purposes of classification as a violent sex offense).
225. Id. § 667.5(c)(3) (West Supp. 2011). See generally id. § 262(a), (a)(1), (a)(4) (West 2008) (defining
spousal rape for purposes of classification as a violent sex offense).
226. Id. § 667.5(c)(4) (West Supp. 2011). See generally id. § 286(a), (c)(1), (c)(2)(A)–(C), (c)(3),
(d)(1)–(3) (West Supp. 2012) (defining sodomy for purposes of classification as a violent sex offense).
227. Id. § 667.5(c)(5) (West Supp. 2011). See generally id. § 288a(a), (c)(1), (c)(2)(A)–(C), (c)(3),
(d)(1)–(3) (West Supp. 2012) (defining oral copulation for purposes of classification as a violent sex offense).
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228

229

sexual penetration,
or rape, spousal rape, or sexual
lascivious acts,
230
231
penetration, in concert —is ten years, with a maximum of fifteen years.
3. Post-Release Supervision Revocation Laws
The law prior to corrections realignment empowered the BPH to initiate and
232
conduct parole proceedings as well as to revoke the parole terms of parolees
233
whose commitment offense was violent, serious, or sexual in nature. Under
prior law, whenever the BPH determined a parolee had violated the terms of his
or her post-release supervision, it had the authority to remand the violator to state
234
235
prison for a revocation sentence lasting up to one year. Furthermore, prior
228. Id. § 667.5(c)(6) (West Supp. 2011). See generally id. § 288(a), (b)(1)–(2) (defining lewd or
lascivious acts “upon or with the body, or any part or member thereof, of a child who is under the age of 14
years, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of that person
or the child” for purposes of classification as a violent sex offense); id. § 667.5(c)(6) (defining other lewd or
lascivious acts for purposes of classification as a violent sex offense).
229. Id. § 667.5(c)(11). See generally id. § 289(a)(1)(A)–(C), (a)(2) (defining forcible sexual penetration
for purposes of classification as a violent sex offense); id. § 289(a)(2) (defining violent sexual penetration
accomplished by threatened kidnapping or false imprisonment); id. § 289(j) (defining “[a]ny person who
participates in an act of sexual penetration with another person who is under 14 years of age and who is more
than 10 years younger than he or she” for purposes of classification as a violent sex offense).
230. Id. § 667.5(c)(18). See generally id. § 264.1 (defining rape, spousal rape, or sexual penetration, in
concert, for purposes of classification as a violent sex offense).
231. Id. § 3000(b)(2), (b)(6)(C) (West 2011).
232. Id. § 3060. See generally id. § 3015 (requiring the Board of Parole Hearings to use an evidencebased computer model—called a parole violation decision-making instrument—to determine how to punish
parole violators); id. § 3015(b)(1) (indicating the model “provides ranges of appropriate sanctions for parole
violators given relevant case factors, including, but not limited to, offense history, risk of re-offense based on a
validated risk assessment tool, need for treatment services, the number and type of current and prior parole
violations, and other relevant statutory requirements”).
233. Id. § 3060. The BPH cannot revoke the parole term of any parolee whose commitment offense was
non-serious, non-violent, and non-sexual, unless the parolee commits a new prosecutable offense. Id. §
3000.03(a)–(c). The parolee has to satisfy other eligibility criteria to qualify for this non-revocable category of
parole: the parolee has not been “found guilty of a serious disciplinary offense,” id. § 3000.03(d), has not
belonged to a prison gang, id. § 3000.03(e), did not refuse to sign his or her parole agreement, id., and has been
determined by the CDCR, “using a validated risk assessment tool,” to not “pose a high risk to reoffend,” id. §
3000.03(g).
234. Id. § 3060. Prior to corrections realignment, the BPH had the ability to send parole violators with
specified drug and health needs to parole reentry courts. Id. § 3015(d). See generally id. § 3015(e)(1) (indicating
parole reentry court programs “direct the treatment and supervision of parolees who would benefit from
community drug treatment or mental health treatment” and utilize “close supervision and monitoring, dedicated
calendars, nonadversarial proceedings, frequent drug and alcohol testing, and close collaboration between the
respective entities involved to improve the parolee’s likelihood of success on parole”); id. (“Only courts with
existing drug and mental health courts or courts that otherwise demonstrate leadership and a commitment to
conduct the reentry court . . . may” participate as reentry courts); id. § 3015(e)(2)–(3) (requiring the Judicial
Council to evaluate each reentry court for its “effectiveness in reducing recidivism” and presents its findings to
the state legislature and the governor). For a definition of the Judicial Council, see infra note 259.
235. PENAL § 3057(a). Before corrections realignment, whenever the BPH revoked a person’s parole, it
had to hold a parole reconsideration hearing within twelve months of the original order to revoke and every year
thereafter until either (1) it returned the prisoner to parole or (2) the prisoner lost his or her parole eligibility. Id.
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state law gave the BPH the authority to extend an imprisoned violator’s
revocation term any time the parole violator committed new acts of
236
misconduct.
B. California’s Post-Release Supervision Laws After Corrections Realignment
The corrections realignment legislation created a county-administered, postrelease supervision program and made it applicable to mid-level felons released
from prison on or after October 1, 2011. The legislation also amended the parole
lengths for certain sex offenders. Furthermore, it provided that California’s trial
courts conduct parole and supervision revocation proceedings through courtappointed revocation hearing officers, and that virtually all supervision and
parole violators serve their revocation terms in county jails. This Section
discusses those changes in some detail.
1. The 2011 Post-Release Community Supervision Act: CountyAdministered Supervision for Mid-Level Felons
The 2011 corrections realignment legislation enacted the Post-Release
237
Community Supervision Act of 2011. Under the Act, all felons released on
parole prior to October 1, 2011 and on parole as of that date remained under state
238
supervision. Furthermore, “high-level” felons (namely, high-risk sex offenders,
offenders with mental disorders, and felons who served prison terms for
committing serious or violent felonies or third strike offenses) continued to go on
239
parole. However, felons released from prison on or after October 1, 2011, and
who are disqualified from serving their executed felony sentences in county jail

§ 3000(b)(4)(C). Under prior law, unless a disqualifier applied, parole violators returned to custody could earn
conduct credits at the same day-for-day rate state prisoners do. Id. § 3057(d)(1). But see id. § 3057(d)(2)(A)–(F)
(noting which violators could not earn conduct credits). For a discussion of conduct credits, see infra text
accompanying notes 272–78.
236. Id. § 3057(c). Specifically, under prior law, the BPH could extend the revocation term by up to 180
days for each offense prosecutable as a felony, by up to ninety days for each offense prosecutable as a
misdemeanor, and by up to thirty days for an action defined by the [CDCR] as a serious disciplinary offense. Id.
See generally id. § 2932(a)(1) (defining “serious disciplinary offense”).
237. Id. § 3450 (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011–12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12).
238. Id. § 3000.09(a), (b) (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by 2011
Stat. ch. 136, amended by 2011–12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12). However, persons paroled prior to October 1 for the
commission of a non-serious, non-violent, and non-sexual offense, and who are not classified by the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation as high-risk sex offenders or offenders with mental disorders, are
eligible for discharge after satisfactorily completing six months of parole. Id. § 3000.09(b)(3) (enacted by 2011
Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 136, amended by 2011–12 1st Ex. Sess.
ch. 12).
239. Id. § 3000.08(a)(1)–(3) (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by
2011–12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12).
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but are not high-level felons, go on county-administered, post-release supervision
240
instead of state-administered parole.
a. Program Implementation
Corrections realignment established that each county’s community
241
corrections partnership had an executive committee responsible for developing
a plan to implement the county’s post-release community supervision and
242
presenting that plan to the county’s board of supervisors. Once a county’s
board of supervisors adopted a post-release community supervision
implementation plan, it designated a local agency to execute the county’s post243
release community supervision strategy. Reportedly, every county “designated
[its] probation department” as the agency responsible for administering post244
release community supervision. Once designated, the responsible agency had to
develop an individualized review process for each of the county’s incoming post245
release community supervision participants (“supervisees”).

240. Id. § 3451 (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39); id. § 3003(a) (amended by
2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by 2011–12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12).
241. Existing law establishes a community corrections partnership within each county. CAL. GOV’T
CODE § 1230(b)(1) (West 2004 & Supp. 2011). A county’s chief probation officer chairs its community
corrections partnership. Id. § 1230(b)(2). The remaining members of a county’s partnership are: a superior court
judge or a designee thereof, id. § 1230(b)(2)A); “[a] county supervisor or the chief administrative officer for the
county or a designee of the board of supervisors,” id. § 1230(b)(2)(B); “[t]he district attorney,” id. §
1230(b)(2)(C); “[t]he public defender,” id. § 1230(b)(2)(D); “[t]he sheriff,” id. § 1230(b)(2)(E); the police chief,
id. § 1230(b)(2)(F); the respective heads of the county departments of social services, mental health,
employment, id. § 1230(b)(2)(G)–(I); the respective heads of the county’s alcohol and substance abuse
programs and office of education, id. § 1230(b)(2)(J)–(K); “[a] representative from a community-based
organization with experience in successfully providing rehabilitative services to persons who have been
convicted of a criminal offense,” id. § 1230(b)(2)(L); and “[a]n individual who represents the interests of
victims,” id. § 1230(b)(2)(M).
242. Id. § 1230.1(a), (b) (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39). Each board of
supervisors could veto the plan presented to it, but only by a four-fifths vote of its membership. Id. § 1230.1(c)
(enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39). If a board rejected the community corrections
partnership’s plan, “the plan [returned] to the partnership for further consideration.” Id.
243. PENAL § 3451(a) (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39).
244. BYERS, supra note 24, at 22.
245. PENAL § 3454(a) (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by 2011–
12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12). Each designated agency may determine additional conditions for each supervisee. Id. §
3454(b) (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by 2011–12 1st Ex. Sess. ch.
12). Corrections realignment legislation provides that additional post-release community supervision
“conditions shall be reasonably related to the underlying offense for which the offender spent time in prison, or
to the offender’s risk of recidivism, and the offender’s criminal history.” Id. § 3454(a) (enacted by 2011 Stat.
ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by 2011–12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12).
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b. The Mandatory Pre-Release Agreement
Under corrections realignment, felons eligible to go on post-release
community supervision instead of parole must “enter into a postrelease
community supervision agreement [with the CDCR] prior to, and as a condition
246
of, their release from prison.” Each post-release community supervision
247
248
agreement must contain certain specifications and conditions. Once one of
these mid-level felons enters into a post-release community supervision
agreement, the CDCR may release the felon into the jurisdiction of the
249
administering county.

246. PENAL § 3452(a) (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15).
247. A post-release community supervision agreement must specify the supervisee’s “release date
and . . . maximum period . . . [of] supervision,” id. § 3452(b)(1), the supervising agency’s contact information,
id. § 3452(b)(2), and “[a]n advisement that if [the supervisee] breaks the law or violates the conditions of
release, he or she can be incarcerated in a county jail regardless of whether or not [the district attorney files]
new charges,” id. § 3452(b)(3).
248. A post-release community supervision agreement must contain the following conditions: the
supervisee must “sign and agree to the [release] conditions,” id. § 3453(a) (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15,
amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by 2011–12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12 ); “obey all laws,” id. § 3453(b);
“report to the supervising county agency within two working days of release from” state prison, id. § 3453(c);
follow the supervising agency’s instructions, id. § 3453(d); “report to the supervising county agency as” the
agency requires, id. § 3453(e); “be subject to search at any time of the day or night, with or without a warrant,
by an agent of the supervising county agency or by a peace officer,” id. § 3453(f); ”waive extradition if found
outside the state,” id. § 3453(g); “inform the supervising county agency of [his or her] place of residence,
employment, education, or training,” id. § 3453(h); “inform the supervising county agency of any pending or
anticipated changes in residence, employment, education, or training,” id. § 3453(i)(1); “inform the supervising
county agency of [any] new employment within three business days,” id. § 3453(i)(2); “immediately inform the
supervising county agency if . . . arrested or” cited, id. § 3453(j); “obtain the permission of the supervising
county agency to travel more than 50 miles from the person's place of residence,” id. § 3453(k); “obtain a travel
pass from the supervising county agency before he or she may leave the county or state for more than two
days,” id. § 3453(l); “not be in the presence of a firearm or ammunition, or any item that appears to be a firearm
or ammunition,” id. § 3453(m); “not possess, use, or have access to any weapon listed” in specified Penal Code
sections, id. § 3453(n); “not possess a knife with a blade longer than two inches” unless the knife is “a kitchen
knife . . . used and kept only in the kitchen of the person's residence,” id. § 3453(o)(1)–(2); “may use a knife
with a blade longer than two inches, if . . . required for [the supervisee’s] employment, the [supervising agency
has approved the] use . . . in a document . . . , and the person possesses the document of approval at all times
and makes it available for inspection,” id. § 3453(p); “agrees to waive any right to a court hearing prior to the
imposition of a period of ‘flash incarceration’ in a county jail of not more than seven consecutive days, and not
more than 14 aggregate days, for any violation of his or her postrelease supervision conditions,” id. § 3453(q);
and agrees to participate in rehabilitation programming as recommended by the supervising county agency,” id.
§ 3453(r).
249. Id. § 3456 (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by 2011–12 1st
Ex. Sess. ch. 12); id. § 3457 (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15). Thirty days before releasing a felon onto postrelease community supervision, the CDCR must provide the administering county with specified “information
that would otherwise be required for parolees.” Id. § 3451(c)(2) (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011
Stat. ch. 39). For a discussion of what that information includes, see supra note 209.
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c. Supervision Lengths
Whenever a county’s probation department gains supervision authority over
a released mid-level felon, it may discharge the felon from supervision after he or
250
she successfully completes six months of supervised release in the community.
However, the probation department must discharge any supervisee who
251
successfully completes just one year of supervised release in the community. In
the event of unsuccessful portions of the supervised release, a probation
department cannot retain a supervisee for more than three years beyond the initial
252
date of the felon’s entry into the program.
2. Amended Parole Lengths for Specified Sex Offenders

253

Corrections realignment provides that life inmates can be discharged from
state custody only after satisfactorily completing six years and six months of
parole if their commitment offense was kidnapping in order to commit rape or
penetration by foreign object, lewd or lascivious acts, forcible sexual penetration,
lewd or lascivious acts with a child under fourteen, a recidivist sex offense, or a
254
habitual sex offense. Furthermore, pursuant to the corrections realignment
legislation, an individual can be discharged from state custody only after
satisfactorily completing twenty years and six months of parole, if required to
register as a sex offender for committing rape against a child less than fourteen
years of age, spousal rape, rape or penetration by foreign object, lewd or
lascivious acts “upon or with the body . . . with the intent of arousing, appealing
to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of that person or the child,”
committing those same lewd or lascivious acts “by use of force, violence, duress,
menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another
250. Id. § 3456(a)(2) (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by 2011–12
1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12).
251. Id. § 3456(a)(3) (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by 2011–12
1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12).
252. Id. § 3451(a) (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39).
253. The corrections realignment legislation increased the parole period “so that the amendments to
[the] Penal Code section [on parole] could be made with a majority vote of the Legislature, rather than the twothirds vote required by Jessica’s Law.” KATHRYN B. STORTON & LISA R. RODRIGUEZ, CAL. DIST. ATT’YS
ASS’N, PROSECUTORS’ ANALYSIS OF THE 2011 CRIMINAL JUSTICE REALIGNMENT 34 (2011), available at
http://www.cpoc.org/php/realign/ab109other/CDAARealignGuide.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review). See generally Cal. Proposition 83 (2006) (enacting the “Sexual Predator Punishment and Control Act:
Jessica's Law” and providing that proposed amendments to the Penal Code sections on parole require a twothirds vote of the state legislature to become law unless the proposed amendments increase the lengths of the
parole periods contained in those sections).
254. PENAL § 3001(c) (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by 2011–
12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12). See generally id. § 209(b) (West 2008) (defining kidnapping); id. § 264.1 (defining
rape or penetration by foreign object); id. § 288 (defining lewd or lascivious acts); id. § 289 (defining forcible
sexual penetration); id. § 667.51 (West 2010) (defining lewd or lascivious acts with a child under fourteen); id.
§ 667.61 (West 2011) (defining recidivist sex offenses); id. § 667.71 (defining habitual sex offenses).
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person,” continuous sexual abuse of a child, or forcible acts of sexual
255
penetration.
3. Post-Release Supervision Revocation Laws: County Jail for Violators of
State or County Post-Release Supervision
Under corrections realignment, California’s trial courts conduct post-release
supervision revocation proceedings for all supervisees and (beginning July 1,
256
257
2013) parolees through court-appointed revocation hearing officers. Most
supervision violations are punishable only by “intermediate sanctions” authorized
by county probation departments, “up to and including referral to a reentry
258
court . . . or flash incarceration in a county jail.” In effect, corrections
realignment makes it difficult to return parolees and supervisees to prison.
255. Id. § 3000(b)(4)(A) (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39). See generally
id. § 261 (West 2008) (defining rape); id. § 262 (defining spousal rape); id. § 264.1 (West Supp. 2011) (defining
“rape or penetration by foreign object”); id. § 288(a) (defining lewd or lascivious acts with a person or child
“with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of that person or . . .
child”); id. § 288(b)(1) (defining lewd or lascivious acts “by use of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of
immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person”); id. § 288.5 (West 2008) (defining
continuous sexual abuse of a child); id. § 289 (West Supp. 2011) (defining forcible acts of sexual penetration).
256. See id. § 3455 (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by 2011–12
1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12) (requiring a “revocation hearing officer” to conduct all post-release community supervision
revocation proceedings beginning October 1, 2011); id. § 3000.08(a), (e) (2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by 2011–
12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12) (requiring California’s trial courts to hear all parole revocation proceedings beginning
July 1, 2013).
257. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 71622.5(b) (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 39) (requiring court-appointed
hearing officers to “make determinations at [revocation] hearings pursuant to applicable law”). The following
individuals qualify to be hearing officers: a person who “has been an active member of the State Bar of
California for at least 10 years continuously prior to appointment,” id. § 71622.5(c)(1)(A); a current or former
“judge of a court of record of California within the last five years, or [any person] eligible for the assigned
judge program,” id. § 71622.5(c)(1)(B); or a current or former “commissioner, magistrate, referee, or hearing
officer authorized to perform the duties of a subordinate judicial officer of a court of record of California within
the last five years.” Id. § 71622.5(c)(1)(C). A “superior court may prescribe additional minimum qualifications
for hearing officers . . . and may prescribe mandatory training for those hearing officers in addition to any
training and education that may be required as judges or employees of the superior court.” Id. § 71622.5(c)(2).
Further, superior courts determine hearing officers’ appointment procedures and compensation. Id. §
71622.5(d). A revocation hearing officer may work in multiple counties. Id. § 71622.5(e).
258. PENAL § 3454(b) (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by 2011–
12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12). See generally id. § 3450(b)(8) (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011–12 1st
Ex. Sess. ch. 12) (defining “Community-based punishment” as “evidence-based correctional sanctions and
programming encompassing a range of custodial and noncustodial responses to criminal or noncompliant
offender activity”); id. § 3450(b)(8)(A) (defining “flash” incarceration as “incarceration in jail for a period of
not more than 10 days”). For a statutory definition of reentry court programs, see supra note 234. Other
examples of intermediate sanctions besides flash incarceration include: “[i]ntensive community supervision,”
id. § 3450(b)(8)(B); electronic home monitoring, id. § 3450(b)(8)(C); community service, id. § 3450(b)(8)(D);
“[r]estorative justice programs, such as mandatory victim restitution and victim-offender reconciliation,” id. §
3450(b)(8)(E); “[w]ork, training, or education in a furlough program,” id. § 3450(b)(8)(F); work release, id. §
3450(b)(8)(G); day reporting, id. § 3450(b)(8)(H); substance abuse treatment, id. § 3450(b)(8)(I); random drug
testing, id. § 3450(b)(8)(J); “[m]other-infant care programs,” id. § 3450(b)(8)(K); and community interventions,
id. § 3450(b)(8)(L).
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a. The Post-Release Supervision Revocation Process for Supervisees
If a county’s probation department determines intermediate sanctions are
inappropriate responses to a particular supervisee’s violations, it may petition the
local superior court’s revocation hearing officer to begin revocation
259
proceedings. If the hearing officer finds the supervisee violated the conditions
260
of the mandatory pre-release agreement, the officer can sentence the supervisee
261
262
to a county jail revocation term lasting up to six months. Alternatively, the
revocation hearing officer can send the supervisee to an evidence-based program
263
such as a reentry court. The hearing officer may return the supervisee to state
264
prison, but only if the supervision violation is a new prosecutable offense.
b. The Post-Release Supervision Revocation Process for Parolees
265

A parole agent or peace officer initiates the parole revocation process when
he or she “has probable cause to believe that [a] parolee is violating any term or
266
condition of his or her parole” and arrests the parolee. Corrections realignment
267
encourages courts to punish parole violators through intermediate sanctions.
However, if the CDCR determines intermediate sanctions are insufficient, it can
petition the local court’s revocation hearing officer to bring revocation
268
proceedings against a parolee. If a hearing officer finds a parolee has violated
259. Id. § 3455(a) (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by 2011–12 1st
Ex. Sess. ch. 12). Corrections realignment legislation directed the Judicial Council to “adopt forms and rules of
court to establish uniform statewide procedures to implement” post-release community supervision revocation
proceedings. Id. Accordingly, “The Judicial Council . . . promulgated, effective October 28, 2011, new rules
(4.540 and 4.541) and a form (CR-300) for revocation of postrelease community supervision.” BYERS, supra
note 24, at 22. See generally Judicial Council, CAL. CTS.: THE JUDICIAL BRANCH OF CAL.,
http://www.courts.ca.gov/policyadmin-jc.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (“The Judicial Council is the policymaking body of the California courts . . . . Under the leadership of
the Chief Justice and in accordance with the California Constitution, the council is responsible for ensuring the
consistent, independent, impartial, and accessible administration of justice.”); Judicial Council Members, CAL.
CTS.: THE JUDICIAL BRANCH OF CAL., http://www.courts.ca.gov/4645.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2012) (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review) (listing the current membership of the Judicial Council).
260. For a discussion of the supervision agreement’s statutorily-mandated conditions, see supra note
248.
261. PENAL § 3455(a)(2) (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by
2011–12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12).
262. Id. § 3000.08(f)(2), (g) (enacted by Chapter 39, amended by 2011–12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12).
263. Id. § 3455(a)(3) (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by 2011–12
1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12); id. § 3000.08(f)(3) (enacted by 39, amended by 2011–12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12). For a
statutory definition of reentry court programs, see supra note 234.
264. PENAL § 3458 (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15).
265. Id. § 3000.08(c) (enacted by Chapter 39, amended by 2011–12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12).
266. Id.
267. Id. § 3000.08(d) (enacted by Chapter 39, amended by 2011–12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12).
268. Id. § 3000.08(f) (enacted by Chapter 39, amended by 2011–12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12). See generally
id. (indicating the “parolee may waive . . . his or her right to counsel, admit the parole violation, waive a court
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the conditions of his or her parole, the officer may sentence the parolee to a
269
270
revocation term in county jail, but only for up to 180 days. Alternatively, the
officer may refer the violator to an evidence-based program, such as a reentry
271
court.

hearing, and accept the proposed parole modification”).
269. Id. § 3455(a)(2) (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by 2011–12
1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12).
270. Id. § 3000.08(f)(2), (g) (enacted by Chapter 39, amended by 2011–12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12).
271. Id. § 3455(a)(3) (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by 2011–12
1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12); id. § 3000.08(f)(3) (enacted by Chapter 39, amended by 2011–12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12).
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APPENDIX C: CALIFORNIA’S EARLY RELEASE AND ALTERNATIVE CUSTODY
LAWS BEFORE AND AFTER THE 2011 CORRECTIONS REALIGNMENT
This Appendix considers California’s early release and alternative custody
laws prior and subsequent to the passage of California’s 2011 corrections
realignment legislation. The legal changes described in this Appendix increased
some jail inmates’ chances to procure early release and alternative custody.
A. California’s Early Release and Alternative Custody Laws Before Corrections
Realignment
Before corrections realignment, conduct credits were calculated at different
rates for state prisoners and jail inmates. Additionally, electronic home
monitoring was available for only some jail inmates. This Section discusses the
laws on those matters in some depth.
1. Early Release: Unequal Conduct Credit Rates for Felons and
Misdemeanants
California’s criminal law provides that the CDCR awards sentence reduction
272
credits—alternately called “good time credits” or “worktime credits” —to state
prisoners convicted under California’s determinate sentencing law on the basis of
273
the prisoners’ conduct. Under existing law, state prisoners serving determinate
sentences are eligible to reduce their sentence lengths by up to one-half through
274
accumulation of such conduct credits for “any period of imprisonment prior to
275
release on parole and any period of imprisonment and parole,” including the
276
time spent housed in a county jail while awaiting transfer to state prison. In
other words, felons may become eligible for release after serving as little as fifty

272. Explanation of California Parole Law, supra note 206.
273. PENAL § 2933(a) (West 2011). But cf. LITTLE HOOVER COMM’N, SOLVING CALIFORNIA’S
CORRECTIONS CRISIS: TIME IS RUNNING OUT 25–26 (2007), available at http://www.lhc.ca.gov/lhc/
185/Report185.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“[Conduct] credit . . . is used more as a population
management tool than an incentive for anything other than staying out of trouble. [Conduct] credits are not
awarded for achieving a goal, they are given to any offender who works to keep the prison running or who signs
up for a program—even if they are just on a waiting list.”).
274. See PENAL § 2933(b) (“For every six months of continuous incarceration, a prisoner shall be
awarded [six months’ worth of] credit reductions from his or her [total] term of confinement . . . .”).
275. Id. § 2900.5(c).
276. Id. § 4019(a)(4); accord id. § 1170(a)(3) (explaining that if a convicted felon’s pre-imprisonment
conduct credit equals or exceeds his or her court-imposed sentence, existing state law deems the felon’s entire
sentence served). But see id. § 1170(a)(3) (requiring a felony sentence to count as a separate prior prison term
for future sentencing purposes even if the felon does not serve any of that sentence in a state prison). See
generally id. § 667.5 (detailing how a court imposes an “[e]nhancement of prison terms for new offenses
because of prior prison terms”).
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277

percent of their prison sentences. Misdemeanants in California may also reduce
278
the lengths of their county jail sentences by accruing conduct credits. However,
before the 2011 corrections realignment, they had to serve at least two-thirds of
279
their sentences before they became eligible for release.
2. Alternative Custody: Electronic Home Monitoring Available for Some
County Jail Inmates
280

A county correctional administrator may offer a supervised, voluntary
281
282
electronic-home-detention program to “minimum security” misdemeanants,
probationers, and persons “participating in a work furlough program” in lieu of
283
being held in jail or serving on probation. Misdemeanants who are not
“minimum security” may also be placed on involuntary electronic home

277. However, felons required to register as sex offenders, committed for a serious felony, or with a
prior conviction for a serious or violent felony, must serve at least two-thirds of their sentences before becoming
eligible for release onto parole, Id. § 2933(e)(3), and prisoners convicted of committing a violent felony offense
must serve at least 85% of their sentences. Id. § 2933.1(a). Furthermore, each of the following types of felons
must serve their sentences completely before becoming eligible for parole: murderers, id. § 2933.2(a); see also
id. § 187(a) (defining murder), certain third strikers, id. § 2933.5(a)(1); see also id. § 2933.5(a)(1) (West 2011)
(defining third strikers), and prisoners committed by the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation to security housing, psychiatric services, behavioral management, or administrative segregation
for specified acts of misconduct, id. § 2933.6(a). A few kinds of state prisoners are eligible for enhanced
conduct credit. For example, prisoners who complete certain rehabilitative programming performance
objectives may earn additional conduct credits of up to six weeks per each twelve-month period of continuous
incarceration. Id. § 2933.05(a). See generally id. § 2933.05(c) (noting “approved rehabilitation programming”
includes “academic programs, vocational programs, vocational training, and core programs such as anger
management and social life skills, and substance abuse programs.”). Heroic prisoners and inmate firefighters
may also earn conduct credit enhancements. See id. § 2935(a), (b) (indicating a prisoner may gain a year’s
worth of conduct credits for performing an act of heroism); id. § 2933.3 (indicating inmate firefighters may earn
two days of credit for every day on assignment or following training for assignment). See generally TAYLOR,
supra note 78, at 17 (Inmate firefighters “carry out fire suppression work and respond to other emergencies,
such as floods and earthquakes. . . . [and] work on conservation projects on public lands and provide labor on
local community services projects.”).
278. PENAL § 4019.
279. See id. § 4019(f) (providing that, for every six-day period, a jail inmate could earn one day off his
or her sentence for good behavior and another day off for satisfactorily performing assigned labor).
280. See id. § 1203.018(k)(1) (West 2012) (“‘Correctional administrator’ means the sheriff, probation
officer, or director of the county department of correction.”).
281. See id. § 1203.018(k)(2) (“‘Electronic monitoring program’ includes . . . home detention
programs . . . .”).
282. See generally id. § 1203.016(h)(2) (West 2004 & Supp. 2010) (defining a “minimum security
inmate” as one who is eligible under Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations for Type IV local detention,
classifiable . . . as a minimum security risk, or eligible “for placement into the community for work or school
activities . . . .”).
283. Id. § 1203.016(a); see also id. § 1203.016(e) (indicating “court[s] may recommend or refer a person
. . . for placement in the home detention program,” as well as “restrict or deny the defendant’s participation
in . . . [the] program”).
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284

detention, but only under the supervision of a designated peace officer and
285
when doing so is necessary to alleviate or avert jail overcrowding.
Under existing law, each person who voluntarily enters an electronic-homemonitoring program must enter into a written agreement promising to comply
286
with the program’s rules. Persons who involuntarily enter electronic-homedetention programs do not enter into written agreements; instead, a county’s
board of supervisors notifies each involuntary home detainee in writing that the
287
detainee must adhere to the rules of the electronic home detention program. All
home detainees must “remain within the interior premises of [their] residence[s]
288
during [designated] . . . hours . . . .” Home detainees may, however, seek work,
work training, medical care, and dental care with their respective correctional
289
administrators’ permission.
A voluntary home detainee must permit the designated supervising agent to
enter the detainee’s residence at any time in order to verify the detainee’s
290
compliance with the rules of the home detention program. Likewise, an
involuntary home detainee must permit the designated supervising peace officer
to enter the detainee’s residence at any time to verify the detainee’s compliance
291
with the rules of the home detention program. All home detainees must permit
electronic monitoring “to verify [their] compliance with [home detention] rules
292
and regulations.” A correctional administrator or a peace officer acting under
the correctional administrator’s direction may, without a court order or arrest
warrant, return any home detainee to county custody if the detainee’s electronic
monitoring device fails or if the detainee willfully deviates from the home
293
detention program’s rules.

284. Id. § 1203.017(a). “Involuntary” home detention is distinguishable from voluntary home detention
in that a correctional administrator places an inmate in a home detention program without seeking the inmate’s
consent to be placed there. Id. §§ 1203.017(c), 1203.016(b)(2).
285. See id. § 1203.017(a) (indicating a “correctional administrator [must determine] that conditions in a
jail facility warrant the necessity of releasing sentenced misdemeanor inmates prior to them serving the full
amount of a given sentence due to lack of jail space” before placing a misdemeanant on involuntary electronic
home detention).
286. Id. § 1203.016(b), (b)(3) (West 2004 & Supp. 2011). A county’s board of supervisors prescribes the
rules of home detention in that county, id. § 1203.016(b), and may charge a voluntary home detainee a fee
(limited to the detainee’s ability to pay) for the voluntary home detention program’s costs. Id. § 1203.016(g).
287. Id. § 1203.017(b). A county’s board of supervisors prescribes the rules of involuntary home
detention in that county, id., and may not charge an involuntary home detainee a fee for the program’s costs. Id.
§ 1203.017(j).
288. Id. §§ 1203.016(b)(1), 1203.017(b)(1).
289. Id. §§ 1203.016(f), 1203.017(f).
290. Id. § 1203.016(b)(2).
291. Id. § 1203.017(b)(2).
292. Id. §§ 1203.016(b)(3), 1203.017(b)(3).
293. Id. §§ 1203.015(b)(4), (c), 1203.017(b)(4), (c).
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B. California’s Early Release and Alternative Custody Laws After Corrections
Realignment
California’s 2011 corrections realignment legislation equalized the conduct
credit earning rate for state prisoners and jail inmates and made electronic home
monitoring available to all jail inmates.
1. Early Release: Equal Conduct Credit Rates for All State Prisoners and
Jail Inmates
The corrections realignment legislation made the conduct credit ratio that
applies to prison inmates applicable to all county jail inmates, including realigned
294
felons and misdemeanants. Thus, as of the legislation’s effective date of
October 1, 2011, any person sentenced to a county jail term is eligible to reduce
295
his or her incarceration term by up to one-half by accruing conduct credits.
2. Alternative Custody: Electronic Home Monitoring Available for All
County Jail Inmates
Under corrections realignment, a correctional administrator may offer
296
voluntary electronic home detention to any jail inmate. Further, a correctional
administrator may place any jail inmate in an involuntary electronic home
297
detention program. And correctional administrators may offer supervised
electronic home monitoring, in lieu of bail, to minimum security, pre-trial jail
298
inmates. Under corrections realignment, voluntary and involuntary home
detainees are eligible to earn day-for-day conduct credits while in a voluntary or

294. Compare id. § 4019 (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by
2011–12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12), with id. § 2933 (West 2011) (describing the conduct credit program for prison
inmates).
295. See id. § 4019(b), (c) (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by
2011–12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12) (providing that “for each four-day period” in confinement, a jail inmate can earn
one day of credit for good behavior and one day of credit for performing assigned labor).
296. Id. § 1203.016(a) (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15).
297. Id.
298. Id. § 1203.018(b) (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15; amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39). The inmate
“must . . . [have] no holds or outstanding warrants,” id. at (c)(1), and a magistrate must approve the electronic
monitoring release, or “[t]he inmate. . . [must be] held in custody for at least 30 calendar days from the date of
arraignment pending disposition of only misdemeanor charges,” id. § 1203.018 (c)(1)(A), or “[t]he inmate . . .
[must be] held in custody pending disposition of charges for at least 60 calendar days from the date of
arraignment.” Id. § 12308(c)(1)(B) (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15; amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39). The rules
applicable to voluntary home detainees, see supra text accompanying notes 288–93, also apply to minimum
security, pre-trial jail inmates on supervised, electronic home detention. See PENAL § 12308(d)(1)–(4), (f), (h)
(enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15; amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39) (providing applicable home detention rules).
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involuntary electronic home detention program, meaning they can reduce their
299
supervised, electronic home detention sentences by up to one-half.

299. PENAL § 2900.5(a) (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15); id. § 4019 (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15,
amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by 2011–12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12). Prior to corrections realignment, the
Penal Code did not refer to home detainees in its enumeration of offenders eligible to earn conduct credits. See
id. § 2900.5(a) (West 2011) (indicating conduct credit-eligible custody includes “any time spent in a jail, camp,
work furlough facility, halfway house, rehabilitation facility, hospital, prison, juvenile detention facility, or
similar residential institution”). See generally STORTON & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 253, at 21 (reporting the
legislature removed home detention from conduct credit consideration “approximately 20 years ago”).
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APPENDIX D: CODE SECTIONS AFFECTED BY THE 2011 CORRECTIONS
REALIGNMENT
Code Sections Affected
Business and Professions Code §§ 585, 650, 654.1, 655.5, 729, 1282.3,
1701, 1701.1, 1960, 2052, 2315, 4324, 5536.5, 6126, 6153, 6788,
7028.16, 7739, 10238.6, 11020, 11023, 11286, 11287, 11320, 16755,
17511.9, 17550.19, 22430, 25618 (amended); Civil Code §§ 892,
1695.8, 1812.125, 1812.217, 2945.7, 2985.2, 2985.3 (amended);
Corporations Code §§ 2255, 2256, 6811, 6814, 8812, 8815, 12672,
12675, 22002, 25540, 27202, 28880, 29102, 29550, 31410, 31411,
35301 (amended); Education Code § 7054 (amended); Elections Code
§§ 18002, 18100, 18101, 18102, 18106, 18200, 18201, 18203, 18204,
18205, 18310, 18311, 18400, 18403, 18502, 18520, 18521, 18522,
18523, 18524, 18540, 18544, 18545, 18560, 18561, 18564, 18566,
18567, 18568, 18573, 18575, 18578, 18611, 18613, 18614, 18620,
18621, 18640, 18660, 18661, 18680 (amended); Financial Code §§
3510, 3532, 5300, 5302, 5303, 5304, 5305, 5307, 10004, 12102, 14752,
17700, 18349.5, 18435, 22753, 22780, 31880, 50500 (amended); Fish
and Game Code §§ 12004, 12005 (amended); Food and Agriculture
Code §§ 17701, 18932, 18933, 19440, 19441, 80174 (amended);
Government Code §§ 1195, 1368, 1369, 3108, 3109, 5954, 6200, 6201,
9056, 27443, 51018.7 (amended); Harbors and Navigation Code §§ 264,
310, 668 (amended); Health and Safety Code §§ 1390, 1522.01, 1621.5,
7051, 7051.5, 8113.5, 8785, 11100, 11100.1, 11105, 11153, 11153.5,
11162.5, 11350, 11351, 11351.5, 11352, 11353.5, 11353.6, 11353.7,
11356, 11357, 11358, 11359, 11360, 11362, 11366.5, 11366.6, 11366.8,
11370.6, 11371, 11371.1, 11374.5, 11377, 11378, 11378.5, 11379,
11379.5, 11379.6, 11380.7, 11381, 11383, 11383.5, 11383.6, 11383.7,
12401, 12700, 17061, 18124.5, 25180.7, 25189.5, 25189.6, 25189.7,
25190, 25191, 25395.13, 25515, 25541, 42400.3, 44209, 100895,
109335, 115215, 116730, 116750, 118340, 131130 (amended);
Insurance Code §§ 700, 750, 833, 1043, 1215.10, 1764.7, 1814, 1871.4,
10192.165, 11161, 11162, 11163, 11760, 11880, 12660, 12845
(amended); Labor Code §§ 227, 6425, 7771 (amended); Military and
Veterans Code §§ 145, 1318, 1672, 1673 (amended); Penal Code §§
17.5, 1203.018, 1230.1, 2057, 3000.08, 3000.09, 3450, 3451, 3452,
3453, 3454, 3455, 3456, 3457, 3458 (new), §§ 17, 18, 19.2, 33, 38,
67.5, 69, 71, 72, 72.5, 76, 95, 95.1, 96, 99, 107, 109, 113, 114, 115.1,
126, 136.7, 137, 139, 140, 142, 146a, 146e, 148, 148.1, 148.3, 148.4,
148.10, 149, 153, 156, 157, 168, 171c, 171d, 181, 182, 186.10, 186.22,
186.26, 186.28, 186.33, 191.5, 193, 193.5, 210.5, 217.1, 218.1, 219.1,
222, 237, 241.1, 241.4, 241.7, 243, 243.1, 243.6, 244.5, 245, 245.6,
246.3, 247.5, 261.5, 265, 266b, 266e, 266f, 266g, 271, 271a, 273.4,
273.6, 273.65, 273d, 278, 278.5, 280, 284, 288.2, 290.018, 290.4,
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290.45, 290.46, 298.2, 299.5, 311.9, 313.4, 337.3, 337.7, 337b, 337c,
337d, 337e, 337f, 350, 367f, 367g, 368, 374.2, 374.8, 375, 382.5, 382.6,
386, 387, 399.5, 404.6, 405b, 417, 417.3, 417.6, 422, 422.7, 453, 455,
461, 463, 464, 470a, 470b, 473, 474, 478, 479, 480, 481, 483.5, 484b,
484i, 487b, 487d, 489, 496, 496a, 496d, 499c, 499d, 500, 502, 506b,
520, 529, 529a, 530.5, 532a, 532f, 533, 535, 537e, 538.5, 548, 549, 550,
551, 560, 560.4, 566, 570, 577, 578, 580, 581, 587, 587.1, 591, 593,
594, 594.3, 594.35, 594.4, 597, 597.5, 598c, 598d, 600, 601, 610, 617,
620, 621, 625b, 626.9, 626.95, 626.10, 629.84, 631, 636, 637, 647.6,
653f, 653h, 653j, 653s, 653t, 653u, 653w, 664, 666, 666.5, 667.5, 668,
800, 801, 803, 836.6, 1168, 1170, 1174.4, 1203.016, 1208.2, 1213,
1320, 1320.5, 2600, 2650, 2772, 2790, 2900.5, 2932, 3000, 3000.1,
3001, 3003, 3056, 3057, 4011.7, 4016.5, 4019, 4131.5, 4501.1, 4502,
4530, 4532, 4533, 4536, 4550, 4573, 4573.6, 4573.9, 4574, 4600,
11411, 11413, 11418, 11419, 12021, 12021.1, 12021.5, 12022, 12022.5,
12022.9, 12025, 12035, 12040, 12072, 12076, 12090, 12101, 12220,
12280, 12281, 12303.3, 12303.6, 12304, 12312, 12320, 12355, 12370,
12403.7, 12422, 12520, 18715, 18720, 18725, 18730, 18735, 18740,
20110, 22810, 22910, 23900, 25110, 25300, 25400, 25850, 27590,
28250, 29700, 30315, 30600, 30605, 30725, 31360, 32625, 33410
(amended), §§ 3060, 3061 (repealed); Public Contract Code §§ 10283,
10873 (amended); Public Resources Code §§ 5097.99, 14591, 25205,
48680 (amended); Public Utilities Code §§ 7680, 7724, 7903, 21407.6
(amended); Revenue and Taxation Code §§ 7093.6, 9278, 14521,
16910, 18631.7, 19705, 19708, 30459.15, 32471.5, 32555, 38800,
40211.5, 41171.5, 43522.5, 43606, 45867.5, 45955, 46628, 46705,
50156.18, 55332.5, 55363, 60637 (amended); Vehicle Code §§ 2478,
2800.4, 4463, 10501, 10752, 10801, 10802, 10803, 10851, 21464,
21651, 23104, 23105, 23109, 23109.1, 23110, 23550, 42000 (amended);
Water Code § 13387 (amended); Welfare and Institutions Code §
1710.5 (new), §§ 871.5, 1001.5, 1731.5, 1768.7, 1768.85, 3002, 7326,
8100, 8101, 8103, 10980, 14107.2, 14107.3, 14107.4, 17410 (amended).
AB 109 (Committee on Budget); 2011 STAT. Ch. 15.
Government Code § 71622.5 (new); Health and Safety Code §§ 11356,
11381, 115215 (amended); Penal Code § 3000.08 (amended, repealed,
and new), § 3073.1 (new), §§ 17.5, 186.22, 186.26, 186.33, 245, 273.4,
290.018, 298.2, 299.5, 422, 455, 598c, 598d, 600, 666, 667.5, 800,
1170, 1170.1, 1203.018, 1230, 1230.1, 2057, 2932, 3000, 3000.09,
3000.1, 3001, 3003, 3015, 3056, 3057, 3451, 3453, 3454, 3455, 3456,
4011.10, 4016.5, 4019, 11418, 12021.5, 12022, 12022.5, 12022.9,
12025 (amended), §§ 3060, 4115.55 (new and repealed), § 830.5
(amended and repealed); Vehicle Code §§ 23109, 23110 (amended);
Welfare and Institutions Code § 1766.01 (amended), § 1710.5
(repealed); 2011 STAT. Ch. 15 § 636 (amended).
AB 117 (Committee on Budget); 2011 STAT. Ch. 39.
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Penal Code heading of Title 4.5 (commencing with § 13600) of Part 4
(amended and new), §§ 13600, 13601, 13602, 13603, 13800, 13812
(repealed and new), 830.5, 1170, 3000.08, 3000.09 (amended), §§
13810, 13811, 13813 (new and repealed); Welfare and Institutions Code
§ 1731.5 (amended); Senate Bill 92 of the 2011–12 Regular Session §
83 (amended); Assembly Bill 117 of the 2011–12 Regular Session § 69
(amended).
AB 116 (Committee on Budget); 2011 STAT. Ch. 136.
Government Code §§ 26605, 30025 (amended); Health and Safety
Code§§ 11355, 11382 (amended); Penal Code § 2932 (repealed and
new), §§ 1233.15, 3460, 3465, 4019.2, 4115.56 (new), §§ 17, 18, 273d,
667.5, 800, 1170, 1170.1, 2933, 3000.08, 3000.09, 3001, 3003, 3056,
3057, 3060.7, 3067, 3073.1, 3450, 3453, 3454, 3455, 3456, 4000, 4019,
4501.1, 4530, 12021.5, 12025 (amended); 2011 STAT. Ch. 136 § 9
(amended), 2011 STAT. Ch. 33 § 2.00 Item 5225-007-0001 (amended).
ABX1 17 (Blumenfield); 2011 STAT. Ch. 12.
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